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1.1	  Background	  Environmental	   problems	   have	   emerged	   as	   among	   the	   gravest	   and	   most	   urgent	  challenges	   for	   the	   international	   community	   today.	   Not	   least	   is	   this	   true	   regarding	  climate	  change;	  the	  acclaimed	  Stern	  Review	  finds	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  risk	  to	  negatively	  impact	  many	  of	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	  human	  beings	  around	  the	  globe,	  such	  as	  access	   to	   water	   and	   food	   production.	   The	   review	   emphasises	   the	   magnitude	   of	  consequences,	   some	   irreversible,	   should	  business	  as	  usual	  be	  continued	  and	  urges	   the	  global	   community	   to	   take	   action.1	   The	   need	   to	   act	   on	   this	   matter	   has	   also	   been	  recognised	  by	  states	  through	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  and	  the	  linked	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  where	  states	  have	  committed	  to	  reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.2	  Indeed,	  to	  combat	  climate	  change	  decreased	  emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  play	  an	  important	  role.	  In	  this	  respect,	  reports	  show	  that	  the	  single	  largest	  contributor	  to	   climate	   change	   through	   production	   of	   greenhouse	   gases	   is	   electricity	   and	   heat	  generation.3	  	  	  In	   attempts	   to	   address	   climate	   change	   many	   states	   have	   introduced	   programmes	   to	  increase	   the	   production	   and	   use	   of	   renewable	   energy	   through	   subsidisation	   of	   that	  particular	  industry.4	  Notably,	  the	  use	  of	  green	  energy	  subsidies	  has	  increased	  at	  a	  high	  rate	  in	  recent	  years.	  According	  to	  World	  Energy	  Outlook	  2013,	  subsidies	  for	  renewable	  energy	   amounted	   to	   101	   billion	   USD	   in	   2012,	   an	   increase	   by	   11	  %	   from	   2011.5	   The	  biggest	   users	   of	   green	   energy	   subsidies	   are	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   US,	   but	   also	   another	   65	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Nicholas	  Stern,	  The	  Economics	  of	  Climate	  Change:	  The	  Stern	  Review	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2006)	  xv.	  	  2	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (adopted	  9	  May	  1992,	  entered	  into	  force	  21	  March	  1994)	  1771	  UNTS	  107	  (UNFCCC)	  and	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	   (adopted	  11	  December	  1997,	  entered	   into	   force	  16	  February	  2005)	  2303	  UNTS	  162	  (Kyoto	  Protocol).	  3	  Nicholas	  Stern,	  ‘What	  is	  the	  Economics	  of	  Climate	  Change?’	  (2006)	  7	  World	  Economics	  1,	  1.	  4	  Mark	  Wu	   and	   James	   Salzman,	   ‘The	  Next	   Generation	   of	   Trade	   and	   Environment	   Conflicts:	   The	   Rise	   of	  Green	  Industrial	  Policy’	  (2013-­‐2014)	  108	  Northwestern	  University	  Law	  Review	  401,	  419-­‐420.	  5	   International	   Energy	   Agency,	   ‘World	   Energy	   Outlook	   2013:	   Renewable	   Energy	   Outlook’	   (OECD/IEA	  2013)	   226	  <http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2013/WEO2013_Ch06_Renewables.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2015.	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countries	   including	   Canada,	   Japan,	   South	   Korea,	   Israel,	   India	   and	   China	   use	   such	  subsidies.6	  	  	  Not	   only	   are	   such	   subsidies	   prevalent,	   but	   have	   also	   been	   proven	   successful.	   For	  instance,	   the	   Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  has	  deemed	  subsidies	   in	   the	  form	   of	   price	   support	   one	   of	   the	   most	   effective	   incentives	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   the	  emission	   of	   green	   house	   gases.7	  Moreover,	  while	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   does	   not	   specify	  which	  measure	  states	  should	  introduce	  to	  achieve	  the	  emission	  reduction	  goals	  set	  out	  in	  the	  treaty,	  the	  protocol	  nevertheless	  provides	  a	   list	  of	  policies	  that	  states	  can	  use	  to	  reduce	  emissions,	  many	  of	  which	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  subsidies.8	  For	  example,	  the	  protocol	  in	  article	  2(1)(a)(iv)	  mentions	  promotion	  of	  new	  and	  renewable	  energy.9	  	  	  	  However,	  with	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  use	  of	  subsidisation	  programmes	  there	  has	  also	  been	  a	  significant	  rise	  in	  disputes	  in	  the	  WTO	  concerning	  environmental	  measures.10	  This	  can	  be	  showcased	  by	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  brought	  in	  2012	  alone,	  including	  a	  case	  brought	  by	  Japan	   and	   the	   EU	   against	   Canada	   challenging	   a	   feed-­‐in	   tariff	   (FIT)	   programme	  introduced	  by	  Ontario,	  another	  case	  brought	  by	  China	  challenging	  rebates	  for	  renewable	  energy	   installations	   introduced	   by	   states	   in	   the	   US,	   an	   EU	   investigation	   into	   alleged	  unfair	  practices	  by	  China’s	  solar	  panel	  manufacturers	  as	  well	  as	  a	  case	  against	  European	  feed-­‐in	  tariff	  programmes	  by	  China.11	  	  	  It	   is	  not	  the	   first	   time	  in	  history	  the	   interests	  of	   free	  and	  fair	   trade	  and	  environmental	  protection	  have	  been	  set	  against	  each	  other	  in	  WTO	  dispute	  settlement.	  Indeed,	  in	  their	  efforts	   to	   address	   different	   environmental	   problems	   states	   have	   introduced	   various	  measures	   throughout	   history,	   ranging	   from	   rules	   on	   fishing	   methods	   to	   protect	  endangered	  species	  to	  introduction	  of	  border	  measures	  such	  as	  carbon	  taxes	  to	  combat	  climate	  change,	  all	  risking	  to	  conflict	  with	  international	  trading	  rules	  as	  they	  may	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  419-­‐420.	  7	   Robert	   Howse,	   ‘Climate	   Mitigation	   Subsidies	   and	   the	   WTO	   Legal	   Framework:	   A	   Policy	   Analysis’	  (International	   Institute	   for	   Sustainable	   Development,	   May	   2010)	   12	  <www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/bali_2_copenhagen_subsidies_legal.pdf>	  accessed	  21	  April	  2015.	  	  8	  Howse	  (n	  7)	  1-­‐2.	  	  9	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  article	  2(1)(a)(iv).	  10	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  403. 11	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  403-­‐404.	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an	   impact	   on	   trade.12	   While	   cases	   concerning	   measures	   aimed	   at	   protecting	   the	  environment	  were	  common	   in	   the	  mid	  1990s,	   the	  disputes	   then	   largely	  concerned	  the	  GATT	   agreement,	   such	   as	   when	   a	   group	   of	   developing	   countries	   challenged	  environmental	  conditions	  imposed	  by	  the	  US	  on	  imports	  of	  tuna	  and	  shrimp.13	  However,	  in	  recent	  years	  the	  focus	  has	  changed	  and	  increasingly	  the	  disputes	  now	  concern	  what	  has	   been	   labelled	   green	   industrial	   policy,	   i.e.	   policy	   that	   includes	   both	   environmental	  benefits	  as	  well	  as	  protectionist	  aspects,	  such	  as	  subsidies	  for	  renewable	  energy.	  In	  fact,	  Wu	   and	   Salzman	   note	   that	   since	   2009,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   trade	   and	   environment	  disputes	   are	   such	   ‘next	   generation’	   disputes.14	   Thus,	   the	   green	   industrial	   policy	   has	  given	  rise	   to	  clashes	  between	  trade	  and	  environmental	   issues.15	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  note	  that,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   disputes	   in	   the	   1990s	   that	   were	   largely	   seen	   as	   developed	  countries	  trying	  to	  improve	  environmental	  behaviour	  by	  developing	  states,	  the	  disputes	  with	   regards	   to	   green	   industrial	   policy	   do	   not	   exhibit	   the	   same	   divide	   between	  developed	   and	   developing	   countries.16	   Instead,	   the	   issue	   of	   WTO	   consistency	   of	  subsidies	   for	   renewable	   energy	   is	   an	   issue	   that	   extends	   over	   both	   developed	   and	  developing	  countries	  –	  Brazil,	  China	  and	  India	  are	  for	  instance	  leaders	  in	  different	  clean	  energy	  sectors	  respectively.17	  	  	  The	  above-­‐mentioned	   subsidies	   for	   renewable	   energy	   can	   take	  various	   forms,	   such	  as	  blending	  mandates,	  quotas,	  portfolio	  obligations,	   tax	  credits	  and	  FITs.18	  Operational	   in	  more	  than	  65	  countries,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  type	  of	  subsidies	  for	  renewable	  energy	  are	  the	  so-­‐called	  FITs,	  which	  essentially	  aim	  to	  provide	  long-­‐term	  financial	  incentives	  for	  investment	  in	  renewable	  energy	  through	  for	  instance	  a	  guaranteed	  price	  for	  production	  of	   renewable	   energy.19	   FITs	   are	   particularly	   common	   in	   the	   EU,	   with	   many	   of	   the	  member	  states	  operating	  FIT	  programmes.	  Moreover,	   the	  German	  FIT	  programme	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  for	  example	  United	  States	  –	  Import	  Prohibition	  of	  Certain	  Shrimp	  and	  Shrimp	  Products	  (12	  October	  1998)	  WT/DS58/AB/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (US	  -­	  Shrimp)	  and	  Lorand	  Bartels,	  ‘The	  WTO	  Legality	  of	  the	  Application	  of	  the	  EU’s	  Emission	  Trading	  System	  to	  the	  EU	  Emissions	  Trading	  System	  to	  Aviation’	  (2012)	  23	  The	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  429.	  13	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  404.	  	  14	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  442.	  15	   Aaron	   Cosbey,	   ‘Green	   Industrial	   Policy	   and	   the	   World	   Trading	   System’	   (Entwined	   Issue	   Brief	   17,	  International	   Institute	   for	   Sustainable	   Development	   2013)	   3-­‐4	  <www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2013/entwined_brief_green_industrial.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  April	  2015.	  16	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  405.	  17	   Sadiq	   Z.	   Bigdeli,	   ‘Resurrecting	   the	   Dead?	   The	   Expired	   Non-­‐Actionable	   Subsidies	   and	   the	   Lingering	  Question	  of	  “Green	  Space”’	  (2011)	  8	  Manchester	  Journal	  of	  International	  Economic	  Law	  2,	  3.	  18	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  (n	  5)	  225.	  	  19	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  419.	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often	  been	  pointed	  out	  as	  a	  particularly	  successful	  example	  as	  it	  has	  played	  an	  important	  part	  in	  creating	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  strongest	  renewable	  energy	  industries	  and	  has	  been	  beneficial	  for	  the	  environment.20	  	  	  In	  many	  of	  these	  ‘next	  generation’	  cases	  the	  claimants	  have	  challenge	  measures	  taken	  by	  states	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   they	   breach	   the	   WTO	   Agreement	   on	   Subsidies	   and	  Countervailing	  Measures	   (SCM	  Agreement)	  and	   therefore	  should	  be	  withdrawn.	  These	  developments	   have	   lead	   scholars	   to	   award	   attention	   to	   the	   issue	   and	   there	   is	   an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  literature	  considering	  the	  issue	  and	  even	  calling	  for	  reform	  of	  the	  SCM	   Agreement	   to	   accommodate	   subsidy	   programmes	   for	   renewable	   energy.21	   The	  above-­‐mentioned	   developments	   have	   lead	   to	   uncertainty	   regarding	   whether	   it	   is	  possible	   for	   states	   to	   maintain	   subsidies	   for	   renewable	   energy	   such	   as	   FITs	   and,	  moreover,	   concern	   that	   if	   such	  measures	   are	   found	   to	  be	   incompatible	  with	  WTO	   law	  this	  could	  have	  a	  harmful	  effect	  on	  the	  environment	  and	  stall	  the	  attempts	  by	  countries	  to	  address	  environmental	  problems.	  Given	  the	  prevalence	  and	  success	  of	  subsidies	   for	  renewable	   energy,	   particularly	   FITs,	   and	   the	   growing	   number	   of	   cases,	   there	   is	   a	  significant	  need	  for	  clarification	  of	  the	  law	  in	  this	  area.	  	  	  
1.2	  Purpose	  and	  research	  questions	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  clarify	  the	  WTO	  law	  on	  subsidies,	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  with	   respect	   to	   subsidies	   for	   renewable	   energy	   and	   member	   states’	   possibilities	   to	  maintain	  such	  measures	  in	  place.	  Due	  to	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  the	  dissertation,	  the	  topic	  cannot	  however	  be	  covered	  in	  its	  entirety.	  	  	  First,	  while	   there	  are	   several	  different	   types	  of	  measures	   states	   can	  utilise	   to	   increase	  the	   use	   of	   renewable	   energy,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   dissertation	   does	   not	   allow	   all	   to	   be	  considered.	   Therefore,	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   dissertation	   will	   be	   on	   one	   of	   these	   types	   of	  measures,	  namely	  FITs,	  as	  such	  measures	  are	  common,	  particularly	  in	  Europe,	  and	  have	  been	   regarded	   as	   successful.	   While	   states	   may	   design	   FIT	   programmes	   slightly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Michael	  E	  Streich,	  ‘Green	  Energy	  and	  Green	  Economy	  Act,	  2009:	  A	  “FIT”-­‐ing	  Policy	  for	  North	  America?’	  (2010-­‐2011)	  33	  Houston	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  419,	  432.	  21	   See	   for	   example	   Bigdeli	   (n	   17)	   and	   Aaron	   Cosbey	   and	   Petros	   Mavroidis,	   ‘A	   Turquoise	   Mess:	   Green	  Subsidies,	  Blue	  Industrial	  Policy	  and	  Renewable	  Energy:	  The	  Case	  for	  Redrafting	  the	  Subsidies	  Agreement	  of	  the	  WTO’	  (2014)	  17	  Journal	  of	  International	  Economic	  Law	  11.	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differently,	   in	   this	   dissertation	   no	   particular	   scheme	   of	   any	   one	   country	   will	   be	  considered.	   Instead,	   the	   general	   characteristics	   of	   FIT	   schemes	  will	   be	   considered,	   in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  generally	  applicable	  conclusion.	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  the	  dissertation	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  an	  evaluation	  of	  FITs	  against	  all	  provisions	  of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement.	   In	  order	   to	  provide	  an	   in-­‐depth	  analysis,	  the	   scope	   of	   the	   dissertation	   will	   be	   limited	   to	   whether	   FIT	   programmes	   constitute	  specific	   subsidies	  as	  defined	  by	   the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  Whether	  FIT	  programmes	  can	  be	  considered	  specific	  subsidies	  or	  not	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  member	  states	  can	  maintain	  FIT	  programmes	  in	  force	  as	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  subsidy	  and	  the	  requirement	  of	  specificity	  are	  prerequisites	  for	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  to	   be	   applicable.	   Thus,	   if	   FIT	   programmes	   do	   not	   amount	   to	   specific	   subsidies,	   such	  measures	  will	   fall	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   and	   consequently	   are	   not	  subject	  to	  the	  WTO	  disciplines	  on	  subsidies	  and	  cannot	  be	  challenged	  on	  this	  basis.	  This	  evaluation	  will	  require	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  requirements	  laid	  down	  in	  article	  1	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  defining	  a	  subsidy	  as	  well	  as	  in	  article	  2,	  which	  outlines	  the	  requirements	  for	  a	  subsidy	  to	  be	  specific.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  fulfil	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  aim	  the	  dissertation	  will	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  following	  research	  questions:	  	  -­‐	  What	  are	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  FIT	  programmes?	  -­‐	   Do	   FIT	   programmes,	   as	   defined	   in	   the	   dissertation,	   constitute	   specific	   subsidies	  according	  to	  the	  WTO	  SCM	  Agreement?	  	  	  
1.3	  Methodology	  and	  materials	  	  To	   fulfil	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   dissertation	   a	   two-­‐pronged	   approach	   will	   be	   taken,	   first	  concluding	   what	   the	   main	   features	   of	   FIT	   programmes	   are	   and	   then	   using	   the	  conclusions	   as	   a	   model	   to	   evaluate	   whether	   FIT	   programmes	   constitute	   specific	  subsidies	  according	  to	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  The	  two	  separate	  research	  questions	  in	  this	  dissertation	  will	  each	  need	  to	  be	  answered	  with	  a	  different	  methodology.	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The	  methodology	   for	   the	   first	   research	  question,	   aiming	   to	   construct	   a	   type	  of	   ‘model	  FIT’	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  assess	  the	  WTO	  compatibility	  of	  FITs,	  will	  consist	  of	  mapping	   and	   comparing	   the	   design	   of	   existing	   FIT	   programmes.	   The	   comparison	  will	  identify	   the	   main	   features	   of	   FIT	   programmes	   and	   identify	   the	   lowest	   common	  denominator	   –	   thus	   the	   features	   that	   are	   common	   to	   most	   FIT	   programmes	   today	  regardless	  in	  what	  state	  the	  programme	  exists.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  the	  dissertation	  will	  draw	  upon	  the	  design	  of	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  and	  successful	  FIT	  programmes	  and	  the	  existent	  research	  done	  in	  this	  area.	  The	  results	  from	  this	  methodological	  approach	  will	  be	  used	  as	  basis	  for	  the	  discussion	  regarding	  the	  second	  research	  question.	  	  	  The	  FIT	  programmes	  used	   in	   this	  dissertation	   in	  order	   to	  construct	   the	  model	  FIT	  are	  foremost	  programmes	   in	   operation	   in	  Germany,	   France,	   Spain,	   the	  UK	  and	   in	  Ontario,	  Canada.	   These	   particular	   programmes	   have	   been	   chosen	   for	   different	   reasons.	   The	  German	  FIT	  programme	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  the	  mapping	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  as	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  FIT	  programmes	  introduced	  and	  as	  it	  is	  generally	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  FIT	  programmes.	  These	  factors	  have	  led	  to	  that	  it	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  blueprint	  for	  the	  design	  of	  many	  other	  FIT	  programmes	  around	  the	  world	  and	  thus	  has	  influenced	  the	  design	  of	  many	  other	  FITs.22	  This	  makes	  it	  relevant	  to	  include	  in	  the	  comparison	  as	  the	  features	  of	  this	  programme	  likely	  will	  exist	  also	  in	  many	  other	  FITs.	  In	  addition	   to	   the	  German	  programme,	  also	  other	  programmes	  applied	   in	   the	  EU	  have	  been	   included	   in	   the	   study	   as	   the	   design	   of	   such	   programmes	   and	   their	   WTO	  compatibility	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   from	  a	  European	  perspective.	   Lastly,	   the	  Ontario	  programme	  has	  been	  chosen	  because	  it	  is	  a	  programme	  that	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  the,	  so	  far	   only,	   adjudicated	   dispute	   in	   this	   area	   by	   the	   WTO	   adjudicating	   bodies,	   Canada	   -­	  
Renewable	   Energy,23	   and	   it	   therefore	   is	   interesting	   to	   discuss	   the	   features	   of	   this	  particular	  programme	  and	  to	  discern	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  features	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  other	  FIT	  programmes.	  	  	  The	   second	   research	   question	   regarding	  whether	   FIT	   programmes	   constitute	   specific	  subsidies	  will	  be	  answered	  using	  the	  traditional	  legal	  method.	  This	  method	  will	  be	  used	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  431.	  23	  Single	  document	  issued	  by	  the	  AB	  constituting	  the	  two	  AB	  reports	  Canada	  –	  Certain	  Measures	  Affecting	  
the	  Renewable	  Energy	  Generation	  Sector	  (6	  May	  2013)	  WT/DS412/AB/R	  and	  Canada	  –	  Measures	  Relating	  
to	   the	   Feed-­In	   Tariff	   Program	   (6	   May	   2013)	   WT/DS426/AB/R	   <http://docsonline.wto.org>	   (Canada	   –	  
Renewable	  Energy).	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to	   apply	   the	   law	   to	   the	   model	   FIT	   developed	   as	   explained	   above.	   The	   aims	   of	   the	  traditional	   legal	   method	   include	   identifying	   and	   interpreting	   the	   law	   in	   a	   particular	  area.24	  	  As	  this	  dissertation	  aims	  to	  identify	  and	  clarify	  the	  law	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	   and	   subsidies	   for	   renewable	   energy	   as	  well	   as	   apply	   this	   law	   to	   a	   factual	  situation,	  the	  traditional	  legal	  method	  provides	  an	  appropriate	  methodology	  to	  achieve	  the	   aims.	   The	   traditional	   legal	   method	   is	   based	   on	   particular	   sources	   of	   law	   and	   a	  hierarchical	   relationship	   between	   these	   sources.25	   The	   sources	   of	   law	   and	   the	  weight	  accorded	   to	   the	   different	   sources	   will	   vary	   depending	   on	   the	   area	   of	   law26	   and	   it	   is	  therefore	   necessary	   to	   more	   closely	   outline	   the	   appropriate	   sources	   with	   regards	   to	  WTO	  law.	  	  	  Despite	  being	  a	  largely	  self-­‐contained	  area	  of	  law,27	  WTO	  law	  is	  part	  of	  the	  international	  legal	  system.	  With	  regards	  to	  sources	  of	  international	  law,	  article	  38(1)	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance.	  This	  provision	  mentions	  four	   sources	   of	   international	   law,	   namely	   international	   conventions,	   international	  custom,	  general	  principles	  of	  law,	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  teachings	  of	  the	  most	  highly	  qualified	  publicists.	  28	  Although	  none	  of	  the	  WTO	  Agreements	  makes	  an	  explicit	  mention	  of	  article	  38(1)	  of	  the	  ICJ	  Statute,29	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  WTO	  law	  and	  international	  law	  has	  been	  highlighted	  in	  agreements	  as	  well	  as	  in	  case	  law.	  For	  instance,	  article	  3.2	  of	  the	  DSU	  stipulates	   that	   the	  aim	  of	   the	  WTO	  dispute	  settlement	  system	   is	   to	  clarify	   the	  provisions	  of	  the	  WTO	  agreements	  in	  accordance	  with	  customary	  rules	  of	  interpretation	  of	   international	   law.	   In	  addition	   to	   this,	   the	  AB	   in	   the	  case	  US	  –	  Gasoline	  clarified	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  GATT	  that	  it	  is	  not	  to	  be	  read	  in	  clinical	  isolation	  from	  public	  international	  law.30	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Aleksander	  Pecznik,	  Juridikens	  teori	  och	  metod	  (Norstedts	  juridik	  1995)	  33.	  25	  Claes	  Sandgren,	  Vad	  är	  rättsvetenskap?	  (Jure	  förlag	  2009)	  118.	  26	  Jan	  Kleineman,	  ‘Rättsdogmatisk	  metod’	  in	  Fredric	  Korling	  and	  Mauro	  Zamboni	  (eds)	  Juridisk	  metodlära	  (Studentlitteratur	  2013)	  22.	  27	  David	  Palmeter	  and	  Petros	  C.	  Mavroidis,	   ‘The	  WTO	  Legal	  System:	  Sources	  of	  Law’	  (1998)	  92	  American	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  398,	  413.	  28	   Statute	  of	   the	   International	  Court	  of	   Justice	   (26	   June	  1946)	  59	  Stat.	   1055	   (ICJ	   Statute)	   article	  38	  and	  Martin	  Dixon,	  International	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2007)	  23.	  29	  Palmeter	  and	  Mavroidis	  (n	  27)	  399.	  30	  United	  States	  –	  Standards	   for	  Reformulated	  and	  Conventional	  Gasoline	   (26	  April	  1996)	  WT/DS2/AB/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (US	  -­	  Gasoline)	  17.	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The	  WTO	  Agreement	  and	  the	  annexed	  agreements	  are	  treaties	  pursuant	  to	  international	  law	  and	  create	   legal	  rights	  and	  obligations	  for	  the	  member	  states.	  Thus,	   it	   follows	  that	  the	  legal	  text	  is	  the	  principal	  source	  of	  WTO	  law	  and	  therefore,	  as	  was	  stated	  by	  the	  AB	  in	   Japan	   -­	   Alcoholic	   Beverages,	   all	   legal	   analysis	   should	   begin	   with	   a	   textual	  interpretation	  of	  the	  legal	  texts.31	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  legal	  texts	  can	  further	  be	  seen	  in	  article	  3.2	  of	  the	  DSU,	  which	  emphasises	  that	  ‘recommendations	  and	  rulings	  from	  the	  DSB	   cannot	   add	   to	   or	   diminish	   the	   rights	   and	   obligations	   provided	   in	   the	   covered	  agreements’.32	  	  	  	  When	  interpreting	  the	  legal	  agreements	  of	  the	  WTO,	  international	  customary	  law	  will	  be	  important,	  as	  article	  3.2	  of	  the	  DSU	  refers	  to	  customary	  rules	  of	  interpretation	  of	  public	  international	  law.33	  The	  wording	  of	  the	  provision	  has	  been	  taken	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  article	  31	   and	   32	   of	   the	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties,	   as	   these	   provisions	   are	  regarded	  as	  reflecting	  customary	  international	  law	  on	  treaty	  interpretation.34	  Reference	  to	   these	   provisions	   can	   for	   example	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   case	   US	   –	   Gasoline.35	   Hence,	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  agreements	  should	  be	  done	  in	  accordance	  with	  article	  31	  and	  32	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention.	  	  	  Although	  the	  legal	  texts	  are	  undoubtedly	  the	  most	  important	  source	  of	  law,	  there	  are	  in	  addition	  other	  sources	  of	  WTO	  law,	  which	  nevertheless	  informs	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law.	  Earlier	  practice	  under	  both	  the	  GATT	  era	  as	  well	  as	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  WTO	  is	  an	  important	  source	  for	  clarification	  of	  WTO	  law.	  Much	  like	  the	  system	  of	  the	  ICJ,	  the	  adjudicating	  bodies	  of	  the	  WTO	  effectively	  will	  not	  depart	  from	  earlier	  case	  law,	  even	  though	   they	   are	   not	   technically	   bound	   by	   it.36	   Even	   though	   adopted	   reports	   are	   only	  binding	  on	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute,	  the	  AB	  has	  in	  several	  cases	  held	  that	  adopted	  AB	  reports	  as	  well	  as	  adopted	  panel	   reports	   can	  be	   taken	   into	  account,	   as	   in	  US	  –	  Shrimp	  
(Article	  21.5	  –	  Malaysia),	  and	  moreover	  even	  that	  panels	  are	  in	  fact	  expected	  to	  take	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	   Japan	   –	   Taxes	   on	   Alcoholic	   Beverages	   (4	   October	   1996,	   WT/DS8/AB/R,	   WT/DS10/AB/R,	  WT/DS11/AB/R	   <http://docsonline.wto.org>	   (Japan	   –	   Alcoholic	   Beverages)	   14	   and	   Palmeter	   and	  Mavroidis	  (n	  27)	  398.	  	  	  32	  DSU	  article	  3.2(2).	  33	  DSU	  Article	  3.2.	  34	  Palmeter	  and	  Mavroidis	  (n	  27)	  406.	  	  35	  US	  –	  Gasoline	  16-­‐17.	  	  36	  Palmeter	  and	  Mavroidis	  (n	  27)	  400.	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reports	  into	  account,	  as	  in	  US	  –	  Oil	  Country	  Tubular	  Goods	  Sunset	  Reviews.37	  The	  AB	  also	  found	   in	   Japan	   –	   Alcoholic	   Beverages	   that	   this	   applies	   also	   to	   panel	   reports	   adopted	  under	  the	  GATT	  era.38	  The	  AB	  in	  US	  –	  Stainless	  Steel	  clarified	  that	  while	  AB	  reports	  are	  not	  technically	  binding	  on	  anyone	  outside	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute,	  the	  fact	  that	  WTO	  members	   attach	   importance	   to	   these	   reports	   and	   that	   the	   dispute	   settlement	   system	  shall	  ensure	  security	  and	  predictability,	  makes	  the	  legal	  reasoning	  in	  such	  cases	  part	  of	  the	  acquis	  of	  the	  dispute	  settlement	  system.39	  Thus,	  while	  according	  to	  article	  3.2	  of	  the	  DSU	  not	   able	   to	   add	  or	   take	   away	   rights	   and	  obligations	  of	  members	  of	   the	  WTO,	   the	  rulings	  of	  previous	  panels	  and	  the	  AB	  will	  still	  be	  of	  importance	  when	  interpreting	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   legal	   texts	   and	   previous	   reports,	   teachings	   from	   highly	   qualified	  publicists,	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  ICJ	  statute,	  are	  moreover	  part	  of	  the	  material	  considered	  by	  panels	  and	  the	  AB	  when	  adjudicating	  on	  issues	  of	  WTO	  law.40	  Furthermore,	  also	  general	  principles	   of	   law,	   as	  mention	  by	   the	   ICJ	   statute,	   have	   been	  used	  by	  WTO	  adjudicating	  bodies,	   for	   example	   the	   principle	   that	   interpretations	   of	   a	   treaty	   that	   would	   render	  whole	  clauses	  or	  paragraphs	  of	  a	  text	  redundant	  shall	  be	  avoided.41	  	  	  Thus,	  when	  applying	  the	  traditional	  legal	  method	  in	  this	  dissertation,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  be	   aware	   of	   the	   particular	   nature	   of	   the	  WTO	   legal	   system	   in	   order	   to	   appropriately	  apply	  the	  hierarchical	  system	  of	  sources	  of	  law.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  United	  States	  –	  Import	  Prohibition	  of	  Certain	  Shrimp	  and	  Shrimp	  Products	  –	  Recourse	  to	  Article	  21.5	  of	  the	  
DSU	  by	  Malaysia	  (22	  October	  2001)	  WT/DS58/AB/RW	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  	  (US	  –	  Shrimp	  (Article	  
21.5	   -­	  Malaysia))	  para	  109	  and	  United	   States	   –	   Sunset	  Reviews	  of	  Anti-­Dumping	  Measures	   on	  Oil	   Country	  
Tubular	  Goods	  from	  Argentina	  (29	  November	  2004)	  WT/DS268/AB/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (US	  –	  
Oil	  Country	  Tubular	  Goods	  Sunset	  Reviews)	  para	  188	  and	  Peter	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Werner	  Zdouc,	  The	  
Law	  and	  Policy	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2013)	  51-­‐52.	  	  38	  	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  51	  and	  Palmeter	  and	  Mavroidis	  (n	  27)	  401.	  	  39	   United	   States	   –	   Final	   Antidumping	   Measures	   on	   Stainless	   Steel	   from	   Mexico	   (30	   April	   2008)	  WT/DS344/AB/R	   <http://docsonline.wto.org>	   (US	   –	   Stainless	   Steel)	   paras	   158	   and	   160	   and	   Van	   den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  52.	  40	  See	   for	  example	  Argentina	  –	  Measures	  Affecting	  Imports	  of	  Footwear,	  Textiles,	  Apparel	  and	  Other	   Items	  (25	  November	  1997)	  WT/DS56/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (Argentina	  –	  Textiles	  and	  Apparel),	  India	  –	  
Patent	   Protection	   for	   Pharmaceutical	   and	   Agricultural	   Chemical	   Products	   (19	   December	   1997)	  WT/DS50/AB/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (India	  –	  Patents)	  and	  Palmeter	  and	  Mavroidis	  (n	  27)	  408.	  	  41	  Palmeter	  and	  Mavroidis	  (n	  27)	  408.	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1.4	  Disposition	  The	  first	  chapter	  has	  provided	  a	  background	  and	  highlighted	  the	  conflicts	  arising	  in	  the	  area	  and	  elaborated	  on	  why	  these	  are	  problematic	  and	  has	  also	  set	  out	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  dissertation	   and	   specified	   the	   research	  questions.	   In	   chapter	   two,	   the	   structure	   of	  different	  FIT	  programmes	  will	  be	  outlined	  while	   in	   chapter	   three	   the	  dissertation	  will	  move	  on	   to	   consider	   the	   relevant	  WTO	  rules	  and	  whether	  FIT	  programmes	  constitute	  specific	  subsidies	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  Chapter	  four	  will	  provide	  for	  conclusions	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  dissertation.	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2.	  Outline	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  
	  
2.1.	  Renewable	  energy	  programmes	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  FITs	  are	  used	  	  States	  use	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  measures	  to	  promote	  the	  use	  of	  renewable	  energy.	  Among	  these	  direct	   loans,	  grants,	  and	  a	  regulatory	   framework	   to	  encourage	   the	  production	  of	  renewable	   energy	   can	   be	   named.	   The	   use	   of	   such	   programmes	   to	   promote	   the	   use	   of	  renewable	  energy	  has	   increased	   in	  recent	  years:	   for	   instance,	  between	  2005	  and	  2011	  the	   number	   of	   countries	   with	   a	   programme	   for	   production	   of	   renewable	   energy	  increased	   from	   approximately	   55	   to	   118.42	   Most	   often	   governments	   use	   a	   mix	   of	  different	   policies	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   production	   and	   use	   of	   renewable	   energy.	   The	  design	  of	  such	  programmes	  may	  also	  be	  changed	  during	  time	  in	  order	  to	  better	  suit	  the	  aim.43	  However,	   it	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  most	  common	  schemes	  to	  promote	  the	  use	  of	  renewable	   energy	   are	   FITs,	   quotas	   or	   renewable	   portfolio	   standards.	  With	   regards	   to	  FIT	  programmes,	  the	  year	  2010	  at	  least	  45	  states	  had	  introduced	  FIT	  programmes	  at	  a	  national	   level,	   and	   an	   additional	   four	   countries	   used	   them	   at	   regional	   level,44	   thus	  making	   FIT	   programmes	   a	   salient	   feature	   in	   the	   attempt	   to	   increase	   the	   use	   of	  renewable	  energy.	  With	  the	  use	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  the	  demand	  for	  renewable	  energy	  has	  risen	  and	  the	  cost	  for	  installation	  of	  renewable	  energy	  has	  decreased.45	  	  	  
2.2	  Structure	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  FIT	   programmes	   aim	   to	   establish	   long-­‐term	   financial	   incentives	   for	   production	   of	  renewable	  energy.46	  The	  rationale	  for	  FITs	  is	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  initial	  capital	  costs	   necessary	   for	   developing	   renewable	   energy	   projects	   are	   so	   high	   that	   they	   will	  discourage	  investors	  from	  investing	  in	  renewable	  energy,	  and	  thus	  investors	  need	  to	  be	  guaranteed	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  return	  over	  time	  if	  development	  of	  renewable	  energy	  is	  to	  take	   place.47	   In	   essence,	   FIT	   programmes	   are	   price	   support	   mechanisms	   aimed	   at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	   M.	   S.	   Srikar,	   ‘Renewable	   Energy	   Programmes	   in	   the	   European	   Union,	   Japan	   and	   the	   United	   States	   –	  Compatibility	  with	  WTO	  Law’	  (2012)	  Indian	  Institute	  for	  Foreign	  Trade,	  Centre	  for	  WTO	  Studies	  Working	  Paper	  200/4,	  16	  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179621>	  accessed	  27	  February	  2015.	  43	  Srikar	  (n	  42)	  17.	  44	  Srikar	  (n	  42)	  18.	  45	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  431. 46	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  419.	  47	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  426.	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promoting	   the	   establishment	   of	   sources	   for	   renewable	   energy	   through	   payment	   of	   a	  guaranteed	  price	  for	  energy	  to	  producers.48	  In	  that	  way,	  FITs	  enhance	  the	  incentives	  for	  investing	  in	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  by	  reducing	  the	  investment	  risk.49	  	  	  Essentially,	   a	   FIT	   policy	   is	   an	   economic	   policy	   in	   which	   a	   government	   imposes	   on	  electric	  utility	  companies	  an	  obligation	  to	  purchase	  energy	  from	  renewable	  sources	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  at	  a	  rate	  that	  has	  been	  decided	  by	  the	  government.	  Within	  the	  structure	  is	   included	   an	   obligation	   for	   the	   utility	   companies	   to	   purchase	   all	   the	   electricity	  produced	  by	  the	  renewable	  source	  and	  guarantee	  the	  producer	  of	  renewable	  energy	  full	  access	  to	  the	  electricity	  grid.50	  	  While	   FIT	   programmes	   can	   be	   designed	   in	   slightly	   different	   ways,	   three	   common	  features	   to	   FIT	   programmes	   can	   be	   discerned,	   namely	   a	   purchase	   obligation,	   a	  predefined	  tariff	   level	  and	  a	  long	  duration	  of	  tariff	  payment.51	   	  The	  sections	  below	  will	  elaborate	   slightly	   on	   the	  meaning	   of	   each	   of	   these	   features,	   as	  well	   as	   discuss	   certain	  other	   features	   that	   may	   be	   included	   in	   FIT	   programmes	   and	   the	   financing	   of	   the	  programmes.	  	  	  
2.2.1	  Purchase	  obligation	  One	   important	   feature	   of	   FIT	   schemes	   consists	   of	   an	   obligation	   for	   electric	   utility	  companies	   or	   other	   electric	   grid	   operators	   to	   buy	   all	   the	   electricity	   that	   is	   produced	  from	  renewable	  energy	  producers	   that	  are	  part	  of	   the	  FIT	  programme.	  This	  obligation	  exists	  regardless	  of	  electricity	  demand.52	  This	  means	  that	  when	  a	  producer	  of	  renewable	  energy	   joins	   the	   FIT	   programme	   the	   producer	   is	   guaranteed	   that	   all	   the	   energy	  produced	  from	  the	  renewable	  energy	  installation	  will	  be	  bought	  by	  the	  operator	  of	  the	  electric	  grid,	  and	  thus	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  concerned	  that	  electricity	  produced	  will	  not	  be	  bought	  due	  to	  unfavourable	  prices.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Srikar	  (n	  42)	  21.	  49	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  420-­‐421.	  50	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  425.	  51	   David	   Jacobs,	   Renewable	   Energy	   Policy	   Convergence	   in	   the	   EU:	   The	   Evolution	   of	   Feed-­in	   Tariffs	   in	  
Germany,	  Spain	  and	  France	  (Ashgate	  Publishing	  Company	  2012)	  27	  and	  Srikar	  (42)	  22.	  	  	  	  52	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  27.	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The	  purchase	  obligation	  part	  of	  the	  FIT	  programme	  is	  a	  necessary	  feature	  as	  it	  increases	  investment	   security	   by	   ensuring	   that	   the	   tariff	   payment	   will	   take	   place	   and	   thus	   the	  investor	  will	   receive	  payment	   for	   the	   electricity.	   Indeed,	   the	  purchase	  obligation	   is	   so	  essential	  that	  it	  exists	  in	  all	  FIT	  programmes,	  in	  fact,	  a	  policy	  will	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  FIT	  programme	  if	  it	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  purchase	  obligation.53	  
	  
2.2.2	  Predefined	  tariff	  level	  Another	  essential	   feature	  of	  a	  basic	  FIT	  scheme	  is	   that	  producers	  of	  renewable	  energy	  are	  guaranteed	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  money	  per	  unit	  of	  electricity	  that	  the	  electric	  utility	  companies	  buy	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  purchase	  obligation.54	  As	  mentioned	  above,	   the	  price	   for	   the	   electricity	   set	  by	   the	   government	   as	  part	   of	   a	   FIT	  program	   is	  usually	   set	  higher	  than	  the	  electricity	  price	  for	  electricity	  from	  non-­‐renewable	  sources.	  This	  is	  the	  case	   for	   mainly	   two	   reasons.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   one	   discussed	   briefly	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  rationale	  of	  FIT	  programmes,	  namely	  because	  the	  price	  should	  compensate	  for	  the	  high	  initial	   costs	   associated	   with	   the	   development	   of	   renewable	   energy	   projects	   and	  guarantee	  a	  reasonable	  rate	  of	  return	  to	  the	  investor.	  The	  other	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  price	  should	  reflect	  the	  value	  of	  other	  benefits	  that	  renewable	  energy	  provides,	  such	  as	  social	  and	  environmental	  benefits.55	  	  	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  level	  of	  the	  tariff	  rates	  paid	  to	  producers	  of	  renewable	  energy	  often	  vary	  depending	   on	   the	   type	   of	   technology	   used	   for	   production	   of	   renewable	   energy,	   thus	  making	   it	  possible	   to	  adjust	   the	  tariff	  rate	   to	  match	  the	  cost	  of	  developing	  a	  particular	  technology	  for	  production	  of	  renewable	  energy.	  This	   in	  turn	  enables	  the	  production	  of	  renewable	  energy	   from	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  sources	  and	  a	  possibility	   for	  all	  producers	  to	  get	  a	  reasonable	  return	  on	  their	   investments.56	  The	  tariff	  rate	  can	  also	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  power	  plant	  as	  well	  as	  its	  location.57	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  that	  the	  tariff	  is	  set	  at	  the	  right	  price.	  Otherwise,	  a	  too	  low	  tariff	  risks	  not	  attracting	   investors	  and	  thus	  not	   to	   fulfil	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  FIT	  programme	  and	  a	  too	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  43.	  	  54	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  43.	  55	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  425.	  56	  Srikar	  (n	  42)	  21-­‐22.	  	  57	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  43.	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high	  tariff	  risks	  not	  becoming	  cost-­‐effective,	  giving	  investors	  unnecessarily	  high	  returns	  on	  the	  investment.	  To	  determine	  the	  right	  level	  for	  the	  tariff,	  two	  different	  methods	  have	  been	   created,	   namely	   the	   value-­‐based	  methodology	   and	   the	   cost-­‐based	  methodology.	  When	  determining	  the	  tariff	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  first	  approach	  the	  tariff	  is	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  generation	  of	  electricity.	  This	  value	  can	  be	  assessed	  both	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  electric	  utility	  company	  and	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  society.	  In	  the	  former	   scenario	   the	   value	   is	   derived	   from	   the	   avoided	   costs	   for	   the	   utility	   and	   in	   the	  latter	  the	  external	  costs	  for	  production	  of	  electricity	  from	  other	  sources	  is	  internalised.58	  When	  using	  the	  value-­‐based	  approach,	  the	  price	  for	  electricity	  is	  essentially	  determined	  on	   basis	   of	   the	   avoided	   cost	   for	   generation	   of	   power,	   which	   can	   be	   calculated	   either	  through	   looking	   at	   the	   value	   for	   the	   utility	   or	   the	   value	   for	   society.	  With	   the	   value	   to	  utility	  approach,	  the	  value	  of	  a	  kWh	  of	  electricity	  produced	  from	  a	  renewable	  source	  is	  seen	  as	  equal	  to	  a	  kWh	  of	  electricity	  produced	  from	  conventional	  energy	  sources.	  This	  means	   that	   the	   tariff	   is	   set	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   what	   the	   utility	   would	   have	   paid	   for	  conventionally	  produced	  electricity.	  When	  using	   the	  value	   to	   society	   approach,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  a	  sum	  is	  added	  to	  the	  price	  for	  a	  kWh	  of	  conventionally	  produced	  energy,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  also	  in	  the	  price	  account	  for	  the	  external	  costs,	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  and	  damage	   to	  public	  health	  due	   to	   for	   instance	  pollution,	   avoided	   for	   the	   society	   through	  the	  use	  of	   energy	   from	  renewable	   sources.59	  The	   factors	   in	   the	  value-­‐based	  approach,	  such	  as	  the	  external	  costs,	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  estimate,	  which	  makes	  this	  method	  difficult	  to	  apply.60	  	  	  Due	  to	  these	  difficulties,	  many	  of	  the	  FIT	  schemes,	  not	  least	  in	  for	  example	  Europe,	  use	  another	  method	  instead,	  called	  the	  cost-­‐based	  method.	  When	  the	  cost-­‐based	  method	  is	  used	  the	  costs	  for	  a	  renewable	  energy	  project	  are	  first	  estimated	  and	  then	  a	  reasonable	  return	   is	   added.	   61	   This	   approach	   takes	   into	   account	   production	   costs	   for	   different	  technologies.	  The	  added	  return	  on	  investment	  is	  usually	  determined	  at	  between	  five	  and	  ten	  percent.	  With	  the	  cost-­‐based	  approach,	  there	  is	  no	  link	  to	  the	  price	  of	  energy	  from	  conventional	  sources.62	  Although	  Germany’s	  first	  FIT	  programme	  operated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   a	   value-­‐based	   approach	   in	   terms	  of	   determination	  of	   tariffs,	   a	   change	   in	   the	   law	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  427.	  59	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  65.	  60	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  428.	  61	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  428. 62	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  65-­‐66.	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2000	  instead	  introduced	  tariff	  rates	  based	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  generation	  of	  electricity.63	  The	  German	  FIT	  programme	  now	  uses	  a	  cost-­‐based	  approach	  where	  the	  tariff	  constitute	  of	  a	  base	   price,	   which	   vary	   depending	   on	   the	   project,	   but	   also	   a	   profit	   margin	   that	   is	  determined	  in	  advance.	  This	  system	  in	  the	  German	  FIT	  has	  become	  a	  role	  model	  for	  FIT	  programmes	  worldwide.	  Among	   the	   advantages	  with	   this	  model	   is	   that	   it	   provides	   an	  opportunity	  for	  policymakers	  to	  support	  projects	  using	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  technology	  and	  it	   also	   aims	   to	   increase	   innovation	   by	   decreasing	   the	   tariffs	   over	   time.64	   To	   provide	  another	  example,	  the	  tariff	   level	   in	  the	  Spanish	  FIT	  programme	  is	  since	  2004	  based	  on	  the	   cost-­‐based	   approach,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   specific	   cost	   relating	   to	   different	  production	  technologies	  and	  also	  guarantees	  that	  investors	  will	  get	  a	  reasonable	  rate	  of	  return.65	  	  	  	  	  
2.2.3	  Long	  duration	  of	  tariff	  payment	  	  The	   third	   part	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   FIT	   programmes	   is	   that	   the	   payment	   of	   tariffs	   is	  guaranteed	  over	  a	   long	  period	  of	   time,	  usually	  between	  15	   to	  20	  years,	  but	   it	  can	  also	  extend	  up	   to	   the	   lifetime	  of	   the	   renewable	  energy	   installation.66	  To	  provide	  examples,	  the	   German	   FIT	   programme	   extends	   to	   a	   period	   of	   20	   years,67	   whereas	   the	   FIT	  programme	  operated	  in	  Ontario,	  Canada,	  extends	  up	  to	  40	  years.68	  The	  FIT	  programme	  in	   Spain,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   extends	   25	   years	   for	   certain	   technologies	   such	   as	   solar	  energy,	  whereas	  for	  other	  types	  of	  technologies,	  such	  as	  wind	  power,	  it	  extends	  for	  the	  entire	   lifetime	   of	   the	   technology	   but	   with	   a	   slightly	   higher	   tariff	   level	   the	   first	   15-­‐20	  years.69	  	  The	   long	   duration	   of	   FIT	   contracts	   serve	   several	   purposes	   and	   brings	  with	   it	   several	  advantages	   for	   investors	   in	   renewable	   energy.	   First,	   it	   serves	   the	   purpose	   of	  guaranteeing	  compensation	  for	  the	  high	  initial	  costs	  related	  to	  investment	  in	  renewable	  energy	   production.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   long	   duration	   of	   FIT	   contracts	   guarantees	   the	  investor	   a	   longer	   time	   to	   recover	   the	   initial	   costs	   related	   to	   the	   investment.	   In	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  67.	  64	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  430-­‐431.	  65	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  54.	  66	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  80.	  67	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  78.	  68	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  1.3.	  69	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  79.	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respect	  it	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  length	  of	  the	  FIT	  contract	  often	  is	  related	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  tariff,	  meaning	  that	  the	  shorter	  the	  FIT	  contract	  the	  higher	  the	  tariff	  rate.	  This	  has	  to	  do	   with	   ensuring	   an	   opportunity	   for	   the	   investor	   to	   cover	   the	   cost	   for	   investing	   in	  renewable	  energy	  equipment.	  Hence,	  if	  the	  FIT	  contract	  extends	  for	  a	  shorter	  period	  of	  time,	   the	   investor	  will	   need	   a	   higher	   tariff	   rate	   during	   this	   time	   to	   recover	   the	   costs.	  Moreover,	  the	  long	  duration	  of	  FIT	  contracts	  also	  has	  the	  benefit	  for	  the	  investor	  that	  it	  provides	   security	   for	   the	   investment,	   which	   in	   turn	   brings	   an	   opportunity	   for	   the	  investor	   to	   obtain	   beneficial	   financing	   conditions	   through	   for	   example	   low	   interest	  rates.70	  	  The	  usual	  length	  of	  the	  FIT	  contract	  often	  corresponds	  to	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  renewable	  energy	   installations,	  which	  often	   is	   around	  20	  years.	  Although	   it	  would	  be	  possible	   to	  have	  a	  FIT	  contract	  without	  any	  predetermined	  time	  limit,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  time	  limit	  for	   the	  FIT	   contract	   serves	   the	  purpose	  of	   encouraging	   investment	   in	  new	   technology	  when	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  technology	  has	  been	  reached.	  71	  	  	  
2.2.4	  Other	  features	  -­‐	  local	  content	  requirements	  FIT	  programmes	   can	  also	  be	   combined	  with	   features	  other	   than	   the	  above-­‐mentioned	  three	   characteristics.	   One	   example	   of	   such	   an	   additional	   feature	   is	   a	   so-­‐called	   local	  content	  requirement.	  Such	  policies	  may	  involve	  an	  obligation	  on	  producers	  of	  renewable	  energy	   to	   use	   a	   certain	   proportion	   of	   locally	   produced	   technology	   for	   the	   renewable	  energy	  installation	  in	  order	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  the	  FIT	  programme,	  or	  may	  instead	  of	  an	  obligation	   provide	   a	   financial	   incentive	   to	   use	   local	   technology	   by	   providing	   a	   higher	  tariff	   if	   local	   technology	   is	   used.72	   The	  FIT	  programme	  of	  Ontario	  made	  use	   of	   a	   local	  content	   requirement	  meaning	   that	  only	   renewable	  energy	   installations	  using	  a	  certain	  proportion	  of	  equipment	  produced	  locally	  were	  eligible	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  program.73	  However,	  while	  this	  feature	  is	  sometimes	  included	  in	  FIT	  programmes,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  in	  Ontario,	  this	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  include	  in	  order	  for	  a	  policy	  to	  be	  considered	   a	   FIT	   and	   it	   therefore	   cannot	   be	   said	   to	   be	   a	   characteristic	   feature	   of	   FIT	  programmes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  77.	  	  71	  Jacobs,	  (n	  51)	  77.	  72	  Wu	  and	  Salzman	  (n	  4)	  425.	  	  73	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  1.4.	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2.2.5	  Financing	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  A	  separate,	   in	   that	   it	  does	  not	  change	  the	  basic	   features	  of	   the	  FIT,	  question	  regarding	  the	   design	   of	   the	   FIT	   programmes,	   which	   nevertheless	   may	   have	   be	   of	   significance	  regarding	  whether	  a	  FIT	  programme	  is	  considered	  a	  subsidy	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  later,	  is	  how	  the	  programme	  is	  financed.	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  FIT	  programme	  can	  be	  financed,	  the	  main	  ones	  being	  through	  financing	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  using	  government	  revenues	   from	  taxation	  or	   spreading	  of	   the	  cost	  over	  all	   electricity	  consumers.74	  More	  specifically,	  the	  former	  option	  would	  consist	  of	  a	  public	  body	  using	  public	  funds,	  such	  as	  income	  from	  taxation,	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  FIT	  programme.75	  The	  second	  option	  is	  however	  the	  most	  common	  way	  to	  finance	  FIT	  programmes.	  This	  option	  is	  a	  more	  decentralised	  one,	   involving	   the	   government	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent.	   In	   such	   a	   situation,	   the	   government	  could	  instead	  direct	  a	  private	  body	  to	  both	  execute	  the	  programme	  as	  well	  as	  generate	  the	   funding	   for	   the	   programme	   on	   its	   own.76	   FIT	   programmes	   following	   this	   type	   of	  funding	   often	   charge	   electric	   utility	   companies	   with	   the	   task	   of	   administering	   the	  payment	  for	  the	  FIT	  contracts.	  The	  payment	  most	  often	  comes	  from	  an	  additional	  charge	  applied	  to	  the	  electricity.	  This	  charge	  will	  normally	  be	  spread	  over	  electricity	  customers	  nation-­‐wide	   or	   region-­‐wide,	   depending	   on	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   FIT	   programme,	   thus	  spreading	   the	   cost	   to	  ensure	  a	  minimal	   cost	   for	  each	   individual.77	  This	  method	  means	  that	   the	   additional	   cost	   for	   production	   of	   renewable	   energy	   is	   transferred	   from	   the	  producer	  of	  renewable	  energy	  to	  the	  consumers.	  One	  of	  the	  advantages	  with	  using	  this	  methodology	   is	   that	   no	   government	   revenue	   is	   required,	   which	   according	   to	   Jacobs	  provides	  stability	  to	  the	  system.78	  Such	  a	  system	  leaves	  the	  government	  involvement	  to	  a	  minimum	  –	  extending	  only	  to	  regulate	  the	  activities	  of	  private	  actors,	  thus	  determining	  the	   tariff,	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   tariff	   payment	   and	   obliging	   the	   utility	   operators	   to	  purchase	  all	  electricity	  generated	  from	  renewable	  sources.79	  By	  way	  of	  example,	   it	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  82.	  75	  Maria	  Wilke,	   ‘Feed-­‐in	  Tariffs	   for	  Renewable	  Energy	  and	  WTO	  Subsidy	  Rules:	  An	   Initial	   Legal	  Review’	  (2011)	  International	  Centre	  for	  Trade	  and	  Sustainable	  Development,	  Trade	  and	  Sustainable	  Energy	  Series	  Issue	   Paper	   No	   4,	   11	   <www.ictsd.org/downloads/2011/11/feed-­‐in-­‐tariffs-­‐for-­‐renewable-­‐energy-­‐and-­‐wto-­‐subsidy-­‐rules.pdf>	  accessed	  30	  March	  2015.	  	  76	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  11.	  	  77	  Srikar	  (n	  42)	  21	  and	  Streich	  (n	  20)	  426.	  78	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  82.	  79	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  82.	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be	  noted	   that	   the	  FIT	  programme	   in	  Germany	   is	   financed	   through	  equally	  distributing	  the	  additional	  cost	  among	  final	  consumers,	  thus	  using	  the	  second	  option	  mentioned.80	  	  	  
2.3	  Conclusions	  It	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  a	  model	  FIT	  –	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  various	  design	  options	  for	  FITs	  as	  described	  above	  –	  would	  include	  a	  purchase	  obligation,	  a	  predefined	  tariff	  level	  most	  likely	  based	  on	  the	  cost-­‐based	  method	  thus	  providing	  for	  a	  recovery	  of	  the	  costs	  as	  well	   as	   an	  added	   reasonable	   rate	  of	   return,	   and	  a	   long	  duration	  of	   the	   tariff	   payment.	  With	  regards	  to	   financing,	   it	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  although	  these	  common	  features	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  can	  be	  found,	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  for	  states	  to	  finance	  similar	  programmes	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Jacobs	  (n	  51)	  83.	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3.	  FIT	  programmes	  and	  the	  WTO	  SCM	  Agreement’s	  rules	  on	  specific	  
subsidies	  	  	  
3.1	  Background	  and	  overview	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  subsidies	  in	  the	  WTO	  The	  question	  of	  subsidisation	  is	  contentious,	  largely	  because	  of	  the	  political	  sensitivity	  of	  the	   issue.	   Subsidisation	   involves	   a	   decision	   of	   redistribution	   of	   wealth	   to	   certain	  beneficiaries,	  which	  moreover	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  other	  countries	  through	  distortion	  of	   trade.81	   The	   economic	   rationale	   behind	   subsidies	   and	   the	   regulation	   thereof	   has	  attracted	   much	   debate,	   as	   it	   is	   far	   from	   straightforward	   to	   establish	   exactly	   what	   a	  subsidy	  is,	  which	  subsidies	  should	  be	  allowed	  and	  how	  the	  distinction	  between	  good	  and	  bad	   subsidies	   should	   be	   made.82	   Indeed,	   subsidies	   are	   considered	   very	   sensitive	   in	  international	  trade	  as	  they	  can	  both	  be	  used	  to	  promote	  legitimate	  objectives,	  related	  to	  economic,	   social,	   and	  environmental	  policy	   for	  example,	  but	  also	  have	   the	  potential	   to	  distort	   competition	   and	   create	   adverse	   effects	   for	   other	   trading	   partners.	   Because	   of	  this,	  the	  question	  of	  subsidies	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  much	  debate	  in	  the	  WTO.83	  Nevertheless,	  rules	  on	  subsidies	  have	  been	  agreed	  on	  by	  members	  of	  the	  WTO	  and	  are	  included	  in	  the	  WTO	  law.84	  	  	  While	  the	  rationale	  for	  a	  regime	  on	  subsidies	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  disputed,	  to	  provide	  an	  understanding	  of	   the	   rationale	   for	  a	   subsidy	   regime	   it	   can	  be	  noted	   that	   subsidisation	  may	   distort	   international	   trade	   through	   impairing	   market	   access	   as	   well	   as	   through	  distorting	  competition.	  For	  instance,	  subsidisation	  can	  be	  used	  to	  eliminate	  the	  value	  of	  tariff	   concessions	   that	   states	   agree	   to	  within	   the	  ambit	  of	  WTO	  negotiations,	   as	   states	  through	   subsiding	   its	   domestic	   industry	   effectively	   can	   eliminate	   the	   effect	   of	   tariff	  concessions.	   In	   this	  way	   subsidies	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   a	  way	   for	   states	   to	   protect	   their	  domestic	   industry	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   trading	   partners.85	   Moreover,	   subsidisation	   may	  also	  have	  a	  distorting	  effect	  on	  trade	  due	  to	  that	  third	  countries,	  which	  do	  not	  subsidise	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Andreas	  F	  Lowenfeld,	  International	  Economic	  Law	  (2nd	  ed	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2008)	  216.	  82	  Michael	  Trebilcock	  and	  Michael	  Fishbein,	  ‘International	  Trade:	  Barriers	  to	  Trade’	  in	  Andrew	  T	  Guzman	  and	  Alan	  O	  Sykes	  (eds),	  Research	  Handbook	  in	  International	  Economic	  Law	  (Edward	  Elgar	  2007)	  19.	  83	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  745-­‐746.	  84	  Trebilcock	  and	  Fishbein	  (n	  82)	  20-­‐21.	  85	  Michael	  J	  Trebilcock,	  Understanding	  Trade	  Law	  (Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  2011)	  86.	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their	   industries,	   find	   it	  more	  difficult	   to	  export,	  due	  to	   the	  advantage	  conferred	  on	  the	  domestic	  industry	  in	  the	  subsidising	  state.86	  	  	  	  Another	   aim	   of	   subsidy	   regulation	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	   to	   examine	   certain	   government	  practices	   deemed	   capable	   in	   theory	   of	   distorting	   international	   trade.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	  include	  many	  such	  potential	  measures	  under	  the	  definition	  of	  subsidy	  and	  then	  to	  weed	  out	   the	  damaging	  ones	   later	  on	   in	   the	  process.	  The	  regulation	  of	  subsidies	   thus	  serves	  the	   aim	   of	   transparency,	   in	   that	   it	   makes	   it	   easier	   for	   members	   of	   the	   international	  trading	  community	  to	  scrutinise	  practices	  by	  other	  members	  and	  determine	  which	  are	  harmful.	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   through	   rules	   that	   oblige	   members	   to	   notify	   specific	  subsidies.87	  	  	  	  	  Although	   rules	   on	   subsides	  were	   included	   already	   in	   the	   GATT	   1947,	   subsidies	   were	  then	   sparsely	   regulated	   and	   the	   provisions	   in	   the	   GATT	   only	   obliged	   states	   to	   notify	  subsidies	   with	   an	   effect	   on	   trade	   and	   seek	   to	   avoid	   export	   subsidies	   for	   primary	  products.	  However,	  during	  subsequent	  rounds	  the	  rules	  on	  subsidies	  were	  extended	  and	  clarified,	  eventually	  resulting	   in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.88	  Nowadays,	  WTO	  law	  deals	  with	  subsidies	   in	   two	   ways.	   First,	   a	   subsidy	  may	   be	   deemed	   illegal	   by	   breaching	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.	  Moreover,	  the	  GATT	  permits	  member	  states	  to	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  introduce	   countervailing	   measures	   against	   imported	   goods	   that	   has	   benefitted	   from	  subsidies.89	  While	   the	  regulation	  of	   subsidies	   in	   the	  GATT	   is	  not	  very	  detailed,	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  regulation	  exists	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  which	  provides	  a	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy,	   establishes	  which	   subsidies	   are	  prohibited	   and	   actionable	   as	  well	   as	   outlines	  the	  remedies	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  in	  case	  of	  subsidisation.	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  one	  of	  the	  advantages	  with	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  GATT	  regulation	  of	  subsidies,	  was	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  definition	  of	  subsidy.	  For	  a	  measure	  to	   constitute	   a	   subsidy	   it	   is	   first	   required	   that	   it	   fulfils	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   subsidy	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Trebilcock	  (n	  85)	  86-­‐87.	  87	   Luca	   Rubini,	   ‘What	   does	   the	   recent	   WTO	   litigation	   on	   renewable	   energy	   subsidies	   tell	   us	   about	  methodology	  in	  legal	  analysis?	  The	  good,	  the	  bad,	  and	  the	  ugly’	  (2014)	  EUI	  Working	  Papers	  2014/05,	  18	  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2383799>	  accessed	  6	  April	  2015.	  	  88	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  746-­‐747.	  89	   Alan	   O	   Sykes,	   ‘International	   Trade:	   Trade	   Remedies’,	   in	   Andrew	   T	   Guzman	   and	   Alan	   O	   Sykes	   (eds),	  
Research	  Handbook	  in	  International	  Economic	  Law	  (Edward	  Elgar	  2007)	  101-­‐102.	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article	  1	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  meaning	  that	  it	  must	  consist	  of	  a	  financial	  contribution,	  this	  contribution	  must	  be	  made	  by	  a	  government	  or	  any	  public	  body	  and	  a	  benefit	  must	  be	   conferred.	   Moreover,	   article	   1.2	   establishes	   that	   for	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   to	   be	  applicable,	   the	   subsidy	  must	   also	   be	   specific	   in	   accordance	  with	   article	   2	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.	  	  	  However,	   not	   all	   subsidies	   will	   constitute	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement.	   The	   SCM	  Agreement	   adopts	   a	   ‘traffic	   light’	   approach	   to	   subsidies	   and	   introduces	  different	   rules	  for	   different	   categories	   of	   subsidies.	   Originally,	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   distinguished	  between	   three	   types	  of	   subsidies;	   prohibited	   subsidies,	   actionable	   subsidies,	   and	  non-­‐actionable	   subsidies.	   However,	   following	   the	   expiration	   of	   the	   provision	   on	   non-­‐actionable	  subsidies	  in	  January	  2000,90	  only	  two	  categories	  of	  subsidies	  remain,	  namely	  prohibited	  and	  actionable	  subsidies.91	  	  	  	  After	  having	  briefly	  introduced	  the	  WTO	  regime	  on	  subsidies	  the	  next	  section	  will	  turn	  to	  an	  assessment	  of	  whether	  a	  FIT	  programme	  amounts	  to	  a	  specific	  subsidy	  according	  to	   the	   WTO	   SCM	   Agreement	   through	   a	   more	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   rules	   and	  requirements	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   and	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   relevant	   aspects	   of	   FIT	  programs	   in	   relation	   to	   these	   findings.	   Section	   3.2	   will	   examine	   whether	   FIT	  programmes	   fulfil	   the	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy	  and	  section	  3.3	  will	  consider	   the	   issue	  of	  specificity.	  While	  not	  all	  subsidies	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  WTO	  law,	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  definition	   of	   subsidy	   and	   the	   requirement	   of	   specificity	   are	   prerequisites	   for	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   to	  be	   applicable	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  Thus,	   this	  means	   that	   should	   any	  of	   the	  requirements	   in	   the	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy	  or	  regarding	  specificity	  not	  be	   fulfilled,	   the	  measure	  will	  be	  exempted	  from	  the	  regime	  on	  subsidies.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  See	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  31.	  91	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  770.	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3.2	  Definition	  of	  subsidy	  While	  the	  provisions	  on	  subsidies	  in	  the	  GATT	  lacked	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  subsidy,	   in	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   a	  definition	  of	   the	   term	   subsidy	  was	   for	   the	   first	   time	  included	  in	  article	  1.1.92	  The	  article	  states	  that	  	  	  
1.1	  ‘For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  Agreement,	  a	  subsidy	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  exist	  if:	  
(a)(1)	   there	   is	  a	   financial	   contribution	  by	  a	  government	  or	  any	  public	  body	  
within	  the	  territory	  of	  a	  Member	  […],	  i.e.	  where:	  
	  
(i)	  a	  government	  practice	  involves	  a	  direct	  transfer	  of	  funds	  (e.g.	  
grants,	   loans,	   and	   equity	   infusion),	   potential	   direct	   transfers	   of	  
funds	  or	  liabilities	  (e.g.	  loan	  guarantees);	  	  	  
(ii)	  government	  revenue	  that	  is	  otherwise	  due	  is	  forgone	  and	  not	  
collected	  (e.g.	  fiscal	  incentives	  such	  as	  tax	  credits);	  
	  
(iii)	  a	  government	  provides	  goods	  or	  services	  other	  than	  general	  
infrastructure,	  or	  purchases	  goods;	  
	  
(iv)	  a	  government	  makes	  payments	  to	  a	  funding	  mechanism,	  or	  
entrusts	  or	  directs	  a	  private	  body	  to	  carry	  out	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  
type	   of	   functions	   illustrated	   in	   (i)	   to	   (iii)	   above	   which	   would	  
normally	   be	   vested	   in	   the	   government	   and	   the	   practice,	   in	   no	  





(a)(2)	  	   there	   is	   any	   form	   of	   income	   or	   price	   support	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  
article	  XVI	  of	  GATT	  1994;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	   Luca	   Rubini,	   The	   Definition	   of	   Subsidy	   and	   State	   Aid:	   WTO	   and	   EC	   Law	   in	   Comparative	   Perspective	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2009)	  108.	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   and	  	  	  	  
	  
(b)	  a	  benefit	  is	  thereby	  conferred.’93	  	  In	  short,	  a	  subsidy	  pursuant	  to	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  financial	  contribution	  by	   a	   government	   or	   any	   income	   or	   price	   support	   that	   confer	   a	   benefit.94	   Thus,	   the	  definition	  provides	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  financial	  contribution,	   it	  must	  be	  made	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  said	  financial	  contribution	  by	  a	  government	  must	  confer	  a	  benefit	  for	  a	  subsidy	   to	   exist.	   Notably,	   the	   AB	   has	   in	   its	   jurisprudence	   emphasised	   that	   these	   are	  different	   criteria	   that	   need	   to	   be	   examined	   separately.95	   In	   the	   following	   sections	   the	  meaning	  of	  these	  criteria	  will	  therefore	  be	  examined	  more	  closely	  and	  each	  criteria	  will	  be	  related	  to	  FIT	  programmes.	  	  	  	  	  The	   first	   requirement	  stated	   in	  article	  1.1	   for	  a	  measure	  by	  a	  state	   to	  be	  considered	  a	  subsidy	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  financial	  contribution	  by	  a	  government.	  It	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  part	  of	  article	  1.1	  contains	  both	  a	  requirement	  that	  there	  is	  a	  financial	  contribution	  as	   well	   as	   a	   requirement	   that	   the	   financial	   contribution	   has	   been	   made	   by	   the	  government.	   	   Thus,	   as	   the	   AB	   in	   US	   –	   Countervailing	   Duty	   Investigation	   on	   DRAMS96	  clarified	   -­‐	   for	   a	   subsidy	   to	   exist	   there	   must	   be	   a	   financial	   contribution	   and	   acts	   by	  exclusively	  private	  entities	  will	  not	  be	  considered	   financial	  contributions	  under	  article	  1.1.	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.97	  	  	  
	  
3.2.1	  Financial	  contribution	  –	  purchase	  of	  goods	  Regarding	   the	  existence	  of	  a	   financial	   contribution,	   subparagraphs	   (i)	   to	   (iv)	   in	  article	  1.1	   provide	   an	   exhaustive	   list	   of	  ways	   in	  which	   a	   government	   can	   provide	   a	   financial	  contribution.	  It	  can	  be	  done	  through	  (i)	  direct	  transfer	  of	  funds,	  such	  as	  grants	  and	  loans,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  1.1.	  94	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  108.	  	  95	   Brazil	   –	   Export	   Financing	   Programme	   for	   Aircraft	   (2	   August	   1999)	   WT/DS46/AB/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	   (Brazil	   –	   Aircraft)	   para	   157,	   Canada	   –	   Measures	   Affecting	   the	   Export	   of	  
Civilian	  Aircraft	   (2	  August	  1999)	  WT/DS70/AB/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	   (Canada	  –	  Aircraft)	  para	  156	  and	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  108.	  96	  United	   States	   –	   Countervailing	  Duty	   Investigation	   on	  Dynamic	   Random	  Access	  Memory	   Semiconductors	  
(DRAMS)	  from	  Korea	  (27	  June	  2005)	  WT/DS296/AB/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (US	  –	  Countervailing	  
Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS)	  	  	  97	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  para	  107.	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or	   potential	   direct	   transfer	   of	   funds	   or	   liabilities	   such	   as	   loan	   guarantees;	   (ii)	  government	  revenue	  that	  is	  due	  is	  forgone	  or	  not	  collected,	  such	  as	  fiscal	  incentives,	  (iii)	  provision	  of	  goods	  or	  services	  other	  than	  general	  infrastructure	  or	  purchasing	  of	  goods,	  or	  lastly	  through	  (iv)	  providing	  payments	  to	  a	  funding	  mechanism	  or	  through	  a	  private	  body.98	  Even	   though	   the	   list	   in	  article	  1	  of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement	   is	  exhaustive,	   the	   term	  financial	  contribution	  still	  encompasses	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  transactions,	  as	  was	  evidenced	  in	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV.99	  	  	  As,	  according	  to	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  only	  certain	  conduct	  by	  a	  government	  or	  a	  public	  body	  will	  fall	  under	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy,	  the	  first	  question	  requiring	  an	  answer	  in	  order	   to	   determine	   whether	   a	   FIT	   programme	   is	   a	   subsidy	   is	   whether	   it	   can	   be	  considered	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  subparagraphs	  (i)-­‐(iv).	  	  	  In	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  the	  AB	  pronounced	  on	  the	  general	  interpretation	  of	  article	  1.1(a)1(iii)	  of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  While	   the	  case	  primarily	  concerned	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  measure	  by	   the	  Canadian	  government	  was	  a	   financial	   contribution	   through	  the	   provision	   of	   goods	   included	   in	   article	   1.1(a)(iii)	   -­‐	   the	   case	   concerned	   a	   stumpage	  agreement,	   i.e.	   an	   agreement	   to	   harvest	   timber,	   where	   Canada	   argued	   that	   standing	  timber	  was	  not	  a	  tradable	  good	  as	  it	  is	  attached	  to	  the	  ground	  while	  the	  US	  argued	  that	  the	   term	  goods	   in	   the	  article	  under	  dispute	   included	  as	  goods	  standing	  timber100	   -­‐	   the	  AB	  nevertheless	  also	  pronounced	  on	   the	  general	   interpretation	  of	  article	  1	  of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement	  and	  the	  term	  purchase	  of	  goods	  by	  a	  government.101	  The	  AB	  emphasised	  that	  subparagraph	   (iii)	   complements	   (i)-­‐(ii)	   by	   adding	   to	   the	   monetary	   contributions	  qualifying	  as	  subsidies	  also	  contributions	  in	  kind.102	  The	  AB	  elaborated	  on	  the	  reasoning	  as	   to	   why	   government	   purchase	   of	   goods	   is	   treated	   as	   a	   subsidy	   and	   in	   that	   context	  noted	  that	  the	  purchase	  of	  goods	  from	  a	  company	  by	  the	  government	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  artificially	  increasing	  the	  revenues	  of	  that	  company.103	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  1.	  99	  United	  States	  –	  Final	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Determination	  with	  Respect	  to	  Certain	  Softwood	  Lumber	  from	  
Canada	   (19	   January	   2004)	   WT/DS257/AB/R	   <http://docsonline.wto.org>	   	   (US	   –	   Softwood	   Lumber	   IV)	  para	  52	  and	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  751.	  	  100	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  para	  48-­‐49.	  101	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  para	  53.	  102	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  para	  52.	  103	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  754.	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With	  regards	  to	  FIT	  programmes,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  whether	  a	  FIT	  programme	  can	  be	   considered	   a	   subsidy	   in	   fact	   has	   been	   controversial	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   FIT	  programme	   does	   not	   immediately	   correspond	   to	   what	   would	   be	   considered	   classical	  examples	  of	  a	   subsidy,	   such	  as	  a	  direct	   transfer	  of	   funds	  or	   loans	  by	  a	  government	  on	  more	  beneficial	  terms	  than	  generally	  available	  on	  the	  market.104	  As	  FIT	  programmes,	  as	  pointed	  out	  above,	  essentially	  are	  purchasing	  guarantees,	  the	  closest	  option	  that	  comes	  to	  mind	  is	  purchase	  of	  goods	  by	  a	  government,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  subparagraph	  (iii).	  	  However,	  doubt	  appears	  already	  due	  to	  the	  particular	  properties	  of	  electricity,	  as	  it	  at	  a	  first	   glance	  does	  not	   appear	   self-­‐evident	   that	   electricity	   in	   fact	   is	   a	   good.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  aspect	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  too	  problematic,	  as	  electricity	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  good	  in	   the	   Harmonized	   System	   Nomenclature,	   developed	   by	   the	   World	   Customs	  Organization	  –	  a	  definition	  that	  is	  also	  used	  in	  the	  WTO.105	  Thus,	  the	  physical	  properties	  of	  electricity	  do	  not	  disqualify	  FIT	  programmes	  from	  the	  ambit	  of	  subparagraph	  (iii).	  	  	  	  	  As	   FIT	   programmes,	   as	   outlined	   in	   chapter	   2,	   impose	   on	   electric	   utility	   companies	   an	  obligation	   to	   purchase	   electricity,	   it	   can	   be	   concluded	   that	   the	   programmes	   fulfil	   the	  requirements	  of	  subparagraph	  (iii)	  in	  that	  it	  amounts	  to	  a	  purchase	  of	  good.	  	  	  While	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  assessment	  of	  part	  of	  the	  requirement	  for	  the	  existence	  of	   a	   financial	   contribution	   as	   per	   the	   subparagraphs	   in	   article	   1.1(a)(1),	   namely	   a	  purchase	  of	  goods	   in	  accordance	  with	   subparagraph	   (iii),	   is	   fairly	   straightforward,	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  such	  action	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  government	   in	  the	  broad	  sense	  however	  lends	  much	  more	  of	  a	  problem.	  	  	  
3.2.2	  Financial	  contribution	  –	  by	  a	  government	  	  As	   evidenced	   above,	   each	   of	   the	   subparagraphs	   of	   article	   1.1(a)(1)	   also	   contains	   a	  requirement	  that	  the	  financial	  contribution	  must	  be	  made	  by	  a	  government	  or	  a	  public	  body	  for	  the	  transaction	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  subsidy.	  While	  subparagraph	  (i),	  (ii)	  and	  (iii)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  11.	  105	   Thomas	   Cottier,	   Garba	  Malumfashi,	   Sofya	  Matteotti-­‐Berkutova,	   Olga	   Nartova,	   Joëlle	   de	   Sépibus,	   and	  Sadeq	   Z.	   Bigdeli,	   ‘Energy	   in	  WTO	   Law	   and	   Policy’	   (2009)	   NCCR	   Trade	  Working	   Paper	   No.	   2009/25,	   5	  <http://phase1.nccr-­‐trade.org/images/stories/projects/ip6/IP6%20Working%20paper.pdf>	   accessed	   7	  April	  2015.	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list	   situations	   where	   a	   government	   or	   a	   public	   body	   directly	   makes	   a	   financial	  contribution,	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  also	  covers	  the	  situation	  when	  a	  government	  indirectly	  makes	  a	  financial	  contribution	  through	  a	  funding	  mechanism	  or	  a	  private	  body.106	  Thus,	  article	  1.1(a)(1)(iv)	   explicitly	   states	   that	   a	   financial	   contribution	  will	  be	   considered	   to	  have	   been	   made	   by	   a	   government	   also	   when	   the	   government	   has	   not	   directly	  transferred	  the	  financial	  contribution	  but	  has	  instead	  acted	  through	  making	  payments	  to	  a	   funding	  mechanism,	  or	  by	  directing	  a	  private	  body	  to	  transfer	  the	  contribution	   in	   its	  place.	   In	   order	   for	   actions	   by	   private	   bodies	   to	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   government	   the	  actions	   have	   to	   normally	   be	   vested	   in	   the	   government	   and	   not	   differ	   from	   normal	  practices	  of	  a	  government.107	   In	  other	  words,	   it	   can	  be	  said	   that	  article	  1.1	  of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement	  is	  applicable	  to	  both	  subsidies	  made	  by	  public	  bodies	  and	  by	  private	  bodies,	  however	   with	   the	   important	   limit	   on	   the	   applicability	   that	   it	   only	   applies	   to	   private	  bodies	  when	  they	  exercise	  functions	  that	  would	  normally	  be	  vested	  in	  the	  government	  and	  do	  not	  differ	  from	  practices	  normally	  followed	  by	  governments.108	  	  	  The	   disparate	   ways	   in	   which	   FIT	   programmes	   are	   organised	   in	   different	   countries,	  particularly	   the	   way	   in	   which	   some	   FIT	   programmes	   are	   administered	   and	   financed	  directly	   by	   the	   government	  whereas	   others	   are	   administered	   and	   financed	   by	   private	  entities	  and	  the	  government	  only	  appears	  as	  a	  regulator,	  makes	  the	  distinction	  between	  public	   and	   private	   with	   regards	   to	   a	   financial	   contribution	   in	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	  relevant	  to	  the	  determination	  of	  whether	  FITs	  fulfil	  the	  definition	  of	  subsidy.	  As	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  2,	  FIT	  programmes	  can	  either	  be	  designed	  in	  a	  way	  so	  that	  a	  public	  body	  uses	  public	   funds,	   such	   as	   income	   from	   taxation,	   and	   independently	   carries	   out	   the	   FIT	  programme,	  or	  they	  can	  be	  designed	  so	  that	  a	  government	  directs	  a	  private	  body	  to	  both	  execute	   the	   programme	   as	   well	   as	   generate	   the	   funding	   for	   the	   programme,	   thus	  involving	  the	  government	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent.109	  The	  different	  ways	  a	  FIT	  programme	  can	  be	  designed	  will	  lead	  to	  different	  provisions	  in	  article	  1.1(a)(1)	  being	  applicable.	  	  	  The	   approach	   to	   direct	   and	   indirect	   governmental	   action	   with	   regards	   to	   the	  requirement	   of	   a	   financial	   contribution	   makes	   the	   difference	   in	   design	   of	   utmost	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  1.1(a)(1)	  and	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  para	  108.	  	  107	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  1.1(a)(1).	  	  108	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  12-­‐13.	  109	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  11.	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importance	   for	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   FIT	   programmes	   fulfil	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	  subsidy.	  Wilke	  is	  in	  fact	  suggesting	  that	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  considered	  a	  public	  body	  and	  a	  private	  body	  respectively	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  questions	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.110	  In	  the	  following	  sections	  the	  dissertation	  will	  therefore	  examine	  the	  different	  designs	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  in	  terms	  of	  financing	  brought	  up	  in	  chapter	  2	  and	  determine	  their	  significance	  for	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  a	  subsidy.	  	  	  	  	  
3.2.2.1	  FITs	  financed	  by	  the	  government	  or	  a	  public	  body	  It	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  in	  the	  case	  where	  a	  government	  itself	  executes	  and	  finances	  a	  FIT	  programme,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  financial	  contribution	  made	  by	  a	  government	  should	  be	   fairly	   unproblematic	   to	   establish.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   a	   government	   has	   through	   a	   FIT	  programme	   purchased	   goods,	   i.e.	   electricity,	   and	   thus	   made	   a	   financial	   contribution.	  However,	  often	  it	  is	  not	  the	  government	  itself	  that	  purchases	  electricity	  but	  rather	  some	  other	  body	  subordinate	  to	  the	  government.	  This	  makes	  it	  important	  to	  establish	  what	  is	  included	   within	   the	   term	   ‘government	   or	   a	   public	   body’	   in	   article	   1.1	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.	  	  	  The	  term	  government	  or	  public	  body	  is	  broader	  than	  to	  encompass	  only	  the	  government	  in	  a	  narrow	  sense	  and	  also	  includes	  regional	  and	  local	  authorities	  as	  well	  as	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	   (SOEs).111	  However,	   there	   is	   still	   scope	   for	   interpretation	   of	  which	   bodies	  will	   qualify	   as	   public	   bodies	   and	   case	   law	   provides	   some	   clarification	   of	   this	   issue.	  Initially,	  case	  law	  focused	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  government	  control	  and	  a	  public	  body	  was	  primarily	   interpreted	   to	  be	  an	  entity	  controlled	  by	   the	  government.112	  For	   instance,	   in	  
Korea	  –	  Commercial	  Vessels,	  the	  panel	  in	  its	  finding	  that	  KEXIM,	  the	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  of	  Korea,	  was	  a	  public	  body,	  primarily	  focused	  on	  that	  KEXIM	  was	  owned	  100	  %	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Korea.	  Additionally,	  the	  panel	  considered	  the	  fact	  that	  several	  of	  the	  staff	  in	   management	   positions	   were	   appointed	   by	   the	   president	   and	   members	   of	   the	  Government	  of	  Korea.113	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  13.	  111	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  758.	  112	   Korea	   –	   Measures	   Affecting	   Trade	   in	   Commercial	   Vessels	   (7	   March	   2005)	   WT/DS273/P/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (Korea	  –	  Commercial	  Vessels)	  para	  7.50	  and	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  13.	  	  113	  Korea	  –	  Commercial	  Vessels	  para	  7.50.	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However,	   the	   approach	   taken	   by	   the	   panel	   in	  Korea	   –	   Commercial	   Vessels	   appears	   to	  have	  been	  abandoned	  in	  more	  recent	  rulings.	  The	  term	  public	  body	  was	  interpreted	  by	  the	  AB	   in	  a	   fairly	   recent	  and	   important,	   in	   that	   it	  deviates	   from	  earlier	   case	   law,	   case,	  namely	  US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	   Countervailing	   Duties.114	   In	   this	   case	   the	   AB	   concluded	  that	  the	  key	  to	  whether	  an	  entity	  is	  a	  public	  body	  is	  that	  the	  entity	  in	  question	  possesses,	  exercises	   or	   is	   vested	  with	   governmental	   authority	   and	   not	   predominantly	   its	   formal	  links	  with	  the	  government.	  The	  AB	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  precise	  characteristics	  of	  an	  entity	   that	   is	   vested	  with	   governmental	   authority	  would	   differ	   from	   case	   to	   case	   and	  moreover	   the	   AB	   emphasised	   that	   the	   importance	   in	   the	   determination	   of	  whether	   a	  body	  is	  vested	  with	  governmental	  authority	  is	  not	  that	  such	  delegation	  is	  spelled	  out	  by	  statute,	  but	  rather	  whether	  an	  entity	  de	  facto	  enjoys	  such	  powers.	  While	  acknowledging	  that	  an	  entity	  can	  be	  vested	  with	  authority	  in	  many	  ways,	  the	  AB	  went	  on	  to	  state	  a	  few	  examples,	   including	   existence	   of	   evidence	   that	   an	   authority	   de	   facto	   is	   exercising	  governmental	   functions	   or	   that	   a	   government	   exercises	  meaningful	   authority	   over	   an	  entity.115	  Distancing	  itself	  from	  the	  panel’s	  interpretation	  that	  a	  public	  body	  is	  ‘any	  body	  controlled	   by	   the	   government’	   in	   conformity	   with	   earlier	   case	   law,116	   the	   AB	   instead	  emphasised	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   are	   formal	   links	   between	   a	   government	   and	   an	  entity,	   such	  as	   for	   example	   that	   the	  government	   is	   the	  majority	   shareholder,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  government	  exercises	  any	  meaningful	  control	  over	  the	  entity	  or	   that	   it	   is	   vested	  with	   governmental	   authority.117	   In	   sum,	   in	  US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	  
Countervailing	  Duties	  the	  AB	  essentially	  found	  that	  the	  common	  characteristics	  between	  a	   government	   and	   a	   public	   body	  were	   the	   performance	   of	   governmental	   functions	   or	  that	  they	  are	  vested	  with	  and	  exercise	  the	  authority	  to	  perform	  such	  functions.118	  	  Thus,	  with	   the	   ruling	   in	  US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	   Countervailing	  Duties	   the	   AB	   seems	   to	  have	   deviated	   from	   previous	   case	   law	   and	   put	   less	   emphasis	   on	   formalistic	  requirements	  and	  more	  on	  a	  de	  facto	  examination	  of	  the	  authority	  a	  body	  enjoys.	  Wilke	  notes	  that	  the	  dividing	  line	  between	  a	  public	  body	  and	  a	  private	  body	  after	  this	  case	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  United	  States	  –	  Definitive	  Anti-­Dumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties	  on	  Certain	  Products	   from	  China	  (11	  March	   2011)	   WT/DS379/AB/R	   <http://docsonline.wto.org>	   	   (US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	   Countervailing	  
Duties).	  	  115	  US	  –	  Antidumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties	  paras	  317-­‐318.	  116	  US	  –	  Antidumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties	  para	  320.	  117	  US	  –	  Antidumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties	  paras	  317-­‐318.	  118	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  758.	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not	  formal	  control	  but	  rather	  whether	  the	  entity	  in	  question	  possesses	  the	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  to	  effectively	  govern	  and	  control	  private	  bodies.119	  	  	  Turning	  to	  FIT	  programmes,	  the	  outcome	  in	  a	  case	  would	  naturally	  have	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  case-­‐specific	  circumstances	  but	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  importance	  is	  whether	  the	   entity	   buying	   electricity	   is	   de	   facto	   vested	  with	   governmental	   authority	   and	  US	   –	  
Antidumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties	  effectively	  prevents	  a	  determination	  to	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  solely	  formal	  relations	  to	  the	  government.	  The	  assessment	  of	  whether	  an	  entity	  enjoys	  such	  authority	  will	  be	  done	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  as	  explained	  by	  the	  AB,	  taking	  into	  account	  factors	  such	  as	  whether	  an	  entity	  exercises	  governmental	  functions	  or	  whether	  the	  government	  exercise	  meaningful	  control	  over	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   case	   US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	   Countervailing	   Duties	   arguably	   has	   opened	   up	   for	  situations	   in	  which	   entities	   that	   previously	  would	   have	   been	   considered	  public	   under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  WTO,	  for	  instance	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  may	  not	  be	  considered	  public	  bodies	   due	   to	   the	   requirement	   set	   by	   the	   AB	   in	  US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	   Countervailing	  
Duties.	  As	  explained	  by	  Wilke,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  bodies	  responsible	  for	  executing	  the	  FIT	  programmes	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   requirements	   established	   by	   the	   AB	   in	   US	   –	  
Antidumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties	  makes	  it	  a	  difficult	  assessment.	  Particularly,	  the	  electricity	   markets	   and	   its	   bodies	   often	   constitute	   a	   fragmented	   system	  with	   various	  bodies	   such	   as	   network	   operators	   and	   transmission	   companies,	   which	   could	   be	  considered	   to	   be	   playing	   a	   part	   of	   the	   financial	   contribution.	   As	  Wilke	   points	   out,	   the	  determination	  of	  what	   is	  a	  public	  body	  has	   thus	  been	  made	  harder	  with	   the	  AB’s	  new	  approach	  in	  US	  –	  Antidumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties.120	  	  	  However,	   while	   authors	   such	   as	   Wilke	   predicted	   that	   the	   classification	   of	   entities	   as	  public	  bodies	  would	  prove	  problematic	   in	  the	  assessment	  of	  whether	  FIT	  programmes	  qualify	   as	   financial	   contributions,121	   this	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   have	   been	   the	   case	   in	  practice.	   In	   fact,	   in	   the	   recent	   case	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	   the	  panel,	   in	   a	   finding	  that	  was	   not	   appealed,	   adjudicated	   on	   the	   issue	   of	  whether	   Hydro	   One	   Inc,	   an	   entity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  13.	  	  120	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  14.	  	  121	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  13.	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operating	  generation	   facilities	  and	  distribution	  systems,	  was	   to	  be	  considered	  a	  public	  body.	  	  	  In	   the	   Ontario	   FIT	   programme,	   the	   Ontario	   Power	   Authority	   (OPA),	   acting	   under	   the	  direction	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  and	  Infrastructure,	  was	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  a	  FIT	   programme	   and	   entering	   into	   FIT	   contracts,122	  while	   the	   SOE	  Hydro	  One	   Inc	  was	  responsible	   for	   operating	   generation	   facilities	   and	   distribution	   systems.123	   While	   the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  all	  agreed	  that	  the	  OPA	  was	  a	  public	  body,	  disagreement	  prevailed	  regarding	  Hydro	  One.	  In	  its	  assessment,	  the	  panel	  found	  Hydro	  One	  to	  be	  a	  public	  body	  due	  to	  several	  reasons.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  panel	  noted	  that	  Hydro	  One	  was	  an	  agent	  to	   the	   Government	   of	   Ontario	   and	   particularly	   emphasised	   that,	   according	   to	   the	  definition	  of	  an	  agent	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Ontario	  itself,	  an	  agent	  among	  other	  things	  was	   an	   entity	   which	   had	   been	   assigned	   or	   delegated	   authority	   or	   responsibility,	   or	  which	  otherwise	  had	  statutory	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  to	  perform	  a	  public	  function	  or	  service.	  The	  panel	  considered	  this	   to	  strongly	   indicate	   that	  Hydro	  One	  was	  a	  public	  body	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   requirements	   outlined	   in	   US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	  
Countervailing	  Duties.124	  	  	  Moreover,	   the	   panel	   found	   it	   established	   that	   the	   Government	   of	   Ontario	   exercised	  meaningful	  control	  over	  Hydro	  One	  due	  to	  that	  it	  had	  imposed	  a	  duty	  on	  Hydro	  One	  to	  operate	   generation	   facilities	   and	   distribution	   systems	   and	   distribute	   electricity	   in	  communities	   as	   directed	   by	   the	   government	   and	   that	   the	   government	   had	   extensive	  powers	   to	   define	   the	   conditions	   of	   such	   activities.125	   Due	   particularly	   to	   that	   the	  Government	  of	  Ontario	  through	  the	  public	  bodies	  OPA	  and	  Hydro	  One	  both	  entered	  into	  FIT	  contracts	  and	  transmitted	  and	  distributed	  electricity	  to	  consumers,	  the	  panel	  found	  that	  a	   financial	  contribution	  through	  purchase	  of	  goods	  by	  a	  government	  under	  article	  1.1(a)(1)(iii)	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  had	  been	  established.126	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	   Canada	   –	   Certain	   Measures	   Affecting	   the	   Renewable	   Energy	   Generation	   Sector	   (19	   December	   2012)	  WT/DS412/R	  and	  Canada	  –	  Measures	  Relating	  to	  the	  Feed-­In	  Tariff	  Program	  (World	  Trade	  Organization,	  19	  December	  2012,	  WT/DS426/R)	  (Single	  document)	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (Canada	  –	  Renewable	  
Energy	  (Panel	  Report))	  paras	  7.195-­‐7.196.	  	  123	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  (Panel	  Report)	  para	  7.235.	  124	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  (Panel	  Report)	  paras	  7.234-­‐7.235.	  125	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  (Panel	  Report)	  paras	  7.234-­‐7.235.	  126	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  (Panel	  Report)	  para	  7.239.	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Thus,	   despite	   the	   stricter	   requirements	   established	   in	   US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	  
Countervailing	  Duties	   for	   an	   entity	   to	   be	   considered	   a	   public	   body,	   the	   discussion	   and	  outcome	   in	  Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   shows	   that	  many	   FIT	   programmes	  will	   likely	  qualify	   as	   financial	   contributions	   by	   a	   government	   under	   article	   1.1	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.	  	  
3.2.2.2	  FITs	  financed	  by	  private	  bodies	  	  With	  regards	  to	  cases	  where	  a	  government	  only	  administers	  FIT	  programmes	  through	  laws	   and	   regulations	   and	   delegates	   to	   private	   entities	   to	   finance	   and	   execute	   the	   FIT	  programmes,	   such	   programmes	   may	   less	   easily	   be	   accommodated	   under	   the	  requirements	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  government	  or	  a	  public	  body	  according	  to	  the	  case	  law	  discussed	  above.	  Thus,	  in	  such	  cases	  it	  is	  instead	  necessary	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  provision	  in	   subparagraph	   (iv),	   including	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   article	   1.1	   also	   conduct	   by	   a	  government	  through	  private	  entities.	  When	  a	  government	  delegates	  to	  a	  private	  body	  to	  execute	  the	  FIT	  programme	  or	  only	  introduces	  legislation	  establishing	  a	  FIT	  programme	  private	  parties	  must	  participate	  in,	  particularly	  article	  1.1(a)(1)(iv)	  is	  of	  importance.	  	  	  Subparagraph	  (iv)	  is	  paramount	  with	  regards	  to	  FIT	  programmes	  financed	  and	  executed	  by	  private	  actors	  due	  to	  that	  it	  extends	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  to	  actions	  by	  private	  bodies.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  does	  make	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  applicable	   to	   actions	  by	  private	  bodies,	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   is	   still	  limited	  by	  the	  requirement	   in	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  to	   instances	  where	  a	  government	  has	  ‘entrusted	  or	  directed’	  a	  private	  body	  and	   functions	   that	   ‘would	  normally	  be	  vested	   in	  the	   government	   and	   the	   practice,	   in	   no	   real	   sense,	   differs	   from	   practices	   normally	  followed	  by	  governments’.127	  Wilke	  points	  out	  that	  this	  has	  potential	  to	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	   financial	   contribution	  substantially.128	   	  Thus,	   in	  order	   to	   conclude	  whether	  also	  FIT	  programmes	   financed	   by	   private	   entities	   may	   be	   considered	   to	   provide	   a	   financial	  contribution,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   closer	   examine	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   requirements	   in	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  and	  relate	  those	  to	  the	  requirements	  in	  FIT	  programmes,	  and	  this	  will	  be	  done	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  1.1(a)(1)(iv).	  128	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  13.	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3.2.2.2.1	  Entrust	  or	  direct	  	  Subparagraph	   (iv)	   was	   thoroughly	   examined	   by	   the	   panel	   in	   the	   case	   US	   –	   Exports	  
Restraints,129	  where	   the	   issue	   the	   panel	   had	   to	   adjudicate	   on	   essentially	  was	  whether	  exports	  restraints	  could	  be	  considered	  financial	  contributions	  in	  accordance	  with	  article	  1.1(a)(1)	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement.130	   Of	   particular	   importance	   to	   the	   case	   was	   the	  interpretation	  of	   subparagraphs	  (iii)	  and	  (iv),	  as	   the	  US	  argued	   that	  exports	   restraints	  could	  be	  considered	  provision	  of	  goods	  that	  a	  government	  had	  entrusted	  or	  directed	  a	  private	   body	   to	   make.131	   Starting	   with	   the	   requirement	   in	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   of	   a	  government	  to	  entrust	  or	  direct	  a	  private	  body,	  the	  panel	  in	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  held	  that	  the	  terms	  encompassed	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  government	  is	  executing	  a	  policy	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  private	  body.132	  Analysing	  the	  meaning	  of	  entrust	  and	  direct,	  the	  panel	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  for	  a	  measure	  taken	  by	  a	  government	  to	  amount	  to	  entrustment	  or	  direction	  it	  must	  contain	  an	  element	  of	  delegation	  or	  command	  respectively.	  The	  panel	  outlined	   three	  requirements,	  which,	  according	   to	   the	  panel,	  had	   to	  be	   fulfilled,	  namely	  that	  it	  must	  be	  an	  explicit	  and	  affirmative	  action,	   it	  has	  to	  be	  addressed	  to	  a	  particular	  party	  and	  it	  must	  encompass	  an	  action	  for	  the	  party	  to	  undertake.133	  	  	  Notably,	   the	   panel	   distinguished	   such	   explicit	   and	   affirmative	   action	   from	   situations	  where	   an	   intervention	   in	   a	  market	   by	   a	   government	  may	   lead	   to	   a	   certain	   result	   due	  simply	   to	   prevailing	   circumstances	   at	   a	   particular	   time	   and	   free	   choices	  made	   by	   the	  actors	  in	  the	  market.	  Elaborating	  on	  this	  notion,	  the	  panel	  noted	  that	  governments	  can,	  and	  often	  do,	  intervene	  in	  markets	  with	  different	  policy	  objectives	  in	  mind	  and	  that	  such	  interventions	   can	   have	   different	   results	   and	   that	   an	   action	   by	   a	   government	   does	   not	  fulfil	   the	   requirements	   of	   entrustment	   and	   direction	   simply	   because	   a	   certain	   effect	  occurs.134	  	  	  In	  relation	  to	  this,	  the	  panel	  discarded	  what	  it	  named	  an	  ‘effects	  approach’	  forwarded	  by	  the	  US,	  essentially	  meaning	  that	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  government	  measure	  leads	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	   United	   States	   –	   Measures	   Treating	   Exports	   Restraints	   as	   Subsidies	   (29	   June	   2001)	   WT/DS194/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints).	  130	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.19.	  131	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.19.	  	  132	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.28.	  	  133	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.29.	  134	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.31.	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result	   that	   domestic	   producers	   sell	   their	   products	   to	   domestic	   purchasers	   it	   is	   to	   be	  considered	   equivalent	   to	   a	   government	   requesting	   that	   domestic	   producers	   provide	  goods	  to	  domestic	  purchasers.135	  In	  response,	  the	  panel	  emphasised	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  financial	  contribution	  was	  to	  be	  judged	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  measure	  taken	  by	  the	  government	  and	  not	  exclusively	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  effects	  that	  it	  will	  give	  rise	  to.	  The	   panel	   noted	   in	   this	   respect	   that	   an	   effects	   approach	   would	   have	   far	   reaching	  consequences	  as	  it	  would	  mean	  that	  any	  action	  taken	  by	  a	  government	  that	  might	  give	  rise	  to	  favourable	  conditions	  in	  a	  market	  would	  qualify	  as	  a	  financial	  contribution.136	  In	  further	   support	   for	   its	   argument,	   the	   panel	   held	   that	   the	   approach	   argued	   by	   the	   US	  would	   in	   essence	  make	   redundant	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	   financial	   contribution,	   as	   the	  effects	   approach	   would	   prevent	   the	   requirement	   to	   be	   used	   to	   limit	   the	   number	   of	  government	  actions	  falling	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  The	  panel	  regarded	  this	   to	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  conclusion	   in	  Brazil	  –	  Aircraft	  where	   it	  was	  emphasised	  that	  financial	  contribution	  and	  benefit	  are	  two	  separate	  requirements.137	  	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   panel	   concluded	   that	   when	   determining	   the	   existence	   of	   entrustment	   or	  direction	  the	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  the	  measures	  taken	  by	  the	  government	  rather	  than	  the	  possible	   effects	   caused	   by	   the	   measure.138	   This	   meant	   that	   the	   panel	   came	   to	   the	  important	   conclusion	   that	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   only	   extends	   to	   cover	   certain	   forms	   of	  action	   by	   governments	   and	   notably	   that	   the	   function	   of	   the	   financial	   contribution	  requirement	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   not	   all	   government	   measures	   conferring	   benefits	   are	  considered	  subsidies.139	  In	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints,	   the	  panel	  emphasised	  that	  while	  all	  forms	  of	  financial	  contributions	  must	  involve	  a	  contribution	  of	  economic	  resources,	  not	  all	   transfers	   of	   economic	   resources	   constitute	   financial	   contributions	   according	   to	   the	  SCM	  Agreement.140	  	  	  Essentially,	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   subparagraph	   (iv),	   while	   not	   diverging	   from	   the	  requirement	   of	   a	   financial	   contribution,	   is	   aimed	   at	   preventing	   states	   from	  circumventing	   the	   regime	   on	   subsidies	   by	   acting	   through	   private	   bodies	   instead	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  paras	  8.33-­‐8.35.	  136	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  paras	  8.33-­‐8.35.	  	  137	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  paras	  8.40.	  	  138	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.42.	  	  139	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  110.	  140	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  111.	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directly.	   The	   panel	   noted	   in	  US	   –	   Exports	   Restraints	   that	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   does	   not	  introduce	   any	   other	   measures	   taken	   by	   governments	   than	   those	   mentioned	   in	  subparagraphs	  (i)-­‐(iii),	  but	  only	  extends	  the	  scope	  of	  article	  1.1(a)(1)	  to	  cover	  additional	  actors,	   i.e.	   private	   bodies.141	   The	   role	   of	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   as	   an	   anti-­‐circumvention	  provision	   has	   been	   expressed	   in	   several	   cases	   dealing	   with	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	  subparagraph,	  including	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints,	  where	  the	  panel	  noted	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   was	   to	   prevent	   governments	   from	   avoiding	   the	   provisions	   in	  subparagraphs	   (i)	   to	   (iii)	   by	   acting	   through	   a	   private	   body142	   as	   well	   as	   in	   US	   –	  
Countervailing	   Duty	   Investigation	   on	   DRAMS,	   where	   the	   AB	   argued	   that	   the	  subparagraph	  provides	  for	  a	  measure	  to	  be	  qualified	  as	  a	  subsidy	  where	  a	  government	  has	  used	  a	  private	  body	  as	  an	  agent	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  financial	  contribution	  and	  thus	  essentially	  is	  an	  anti-­‐circumvention	  provision.143	  Pronouncing	  on	  the	  intention	  with	  the	  provision,	   the	  AB	  characterised	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   as	   an	  anti-­‐circumvention	  provision,	  aimed	   at	   ensuring	   that	   governments	  do	  not	   circumvent	   its	   obligations	  under	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	  by	  using	  a	  private	  entity	  as	  a	  proxy.144	  	  	  In	   this	   respect,	  Rubini	  points	  out	   that	   there	   is	  a	   tension	   inherent	   in	   the	   interpretation	  that	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  is	  to	  be	  interpreted	  restrictively	  so	  as	  not	  to	  extend	  the	  scope	  of	  the	   SCM	  Agreement	   to	   include	  more	   government	  measures	   as	   financial	   contributions,	  but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   requiring	   an	   extensive	   interpretation	   to	   fulfil	   its	   objective	   as	   an	  anti-­‐circumvention	   provision.	   In	   interpreting	   the	   provision,	   Rubini	   underlines	   the	  necessity	   of	   balancing	   these	   two	   interests.145	   Regarding	   the	   balance	   struck	   between	  these	   two	   interests,	   a	   development	   in	   case	   law	   can	   be	   noted.	   While	   in	   US	   –	   Exports	  
Restraints,	  the	  panel	  gave	  a	  restrictive	  interpretation	  to	  the	  terms	  entrust	  and	  direct,	  in	  that	   it,	   as	   seen	   above,	   required	   for	   there	   to	   be	   an	   explicit	   and	   affirmative	   action	   of	  delegation	  or	  command,	  in	  the	  following	  judgments	  in	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Investigation	  
on	   DRAMS,	   Korea	   –	   Commercial	   Vessels	   and	   EC	   –	   DRAMS	   the	   AB	   deviated	   from	   this	  interpretation.146	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.53.	  	  142	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.53.	  	  143	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  756.	  144	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  para	  113.	  	  145	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  111.	  146	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  112.	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Elaborating	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  entrusts	  and	  directs	  in	  subparagraph	  (iv),	  the	  AB	   in	   US	   –	   Countervailing	   Duty	   Investigation	   on	   DRAMS	   significantly	   deviated	   from	  earlier	  interpretations.147	  Prior	  to	  the	  AB’s	  ruling,	  the	  panel	  had,	  with	  reference	  to	  US	  –	  
Exports	  Restraints,	  found	  that	  the	  ordinary	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  entrust	  and	  direct	  gave	  that	   the	   actions	   by	   the	   government	   must	   to	   some	   extent	   be	   a	   delegation	   or	   a	  command.148	  Disagreeing	  with	  the	  panel,	  the	  AB	  now	  held	  that	  the	  panel’s	  interpretation	  of	   entrusts	   and	   directs	   as	   delegation	   or	   command	   was	   too	   narrow.	   While	   the	   AB	  recognised	   that	   a	   delegation	   or	   a	   command	   were	   examples	   of	   ways	   in	   which	   a	  government	  could	  entrust	  or	  direct,	  there	  were	  nevertheless	  also	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  could	  be	  done.	  The	  AB	  recognised	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  term	  entrust	  that	  there	  were	  other	  informal	  as	  well	  as	  formal	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  government	  can	  entrust	  a	  private	  body	  than	  through	  an	  act	  of	  delegation.	  Turning	  to	  the	  term	  direct,	  the	  AB	  recognised	  that	  the	  term	  contains	   a	   notion	   of	   authority	   over	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   direction	   but	   that	   there	  nevertheless	  are	  other	  subtler	  ways	  than	  a	  command	  in	  which	  a	  government	  can	  direct	  a	  private	  body.149	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  AB	  in	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  rejected	  that	  the	  terms	  direct	  and	  entrust	  were	  limited	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  delegation	  and	  command.	  Instead,	  the	  AB	  talked	  in	  terms	  of	  entrustment	  being	  an	  action	  of	  giving	  responsibility	  and	  direction	  being	   the	   exercise	   of	   governmental	   authority	   over	   someone.150	   Rubini	   criticises	   this	  interpretation	   and	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   too	   broad	   and	   thus	   risks	   distorting	   the	   balance	  between	   interests	   in	   the	   provisions.151	   He	   argues	   that	   it	   could	   lead	   to	   that	   some	  regulatory	  measures	  by	  governments	   could	   fall	  within	   the	   scope	  of	   the	   term	  direct	   as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  AB,	  even	  though	  the	  AB	  ruled	  this	  out.152	  	  	  Arguably,	  it	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  whether	  government	  regulation	  is	  excluded	  from	  subparagraph	   (iv)	   with	   regards	   to	   FITs	   as	   that	   would	   effectively	   mean	   that	   FIT	  programmes	  would	  not	  be	  considered	  an	  entrustment	  or	  direction.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  112.	  	  148	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  para	  103.	  	  149	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  paras	  110-­‐111.	  150	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  112.	  151	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  114.	  152	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  115.	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While	  the	  case	  law	  brings	  up	  certain	  situations	  of	  government	  regulation	  and	  holds	  that	  this	  cannot	  be	  equated	  with	  a	  financial	  contribution,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  reasoning	  in	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  does	  not	  support	  a	  conclusion	  that	  all	  government	  regulation	  would	  be	  excluded	  from	  constituting	  a	  financial	  contribution.	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   AB	   agreed	   with	   the	   reasoning	   in	   US	   –	   Exports	   Restraints,	   that	  government	   intervention	   in	   a	   market	   cannot	   be	   considered	   entrustment	   or	   direction	  only	   due	   to	   that	   it	   has	   a	   particular	   result	   due	   to	   circumstances	   and	   choices	  made	   by	  actors	   in	   the	  market.153	   This	   notion	  was	   also	   articulated	   in	  US	   –	   Softwood	   Lumber	   IV,	  where	  the	  AB	  stated	  that	  not	  all	  actions	  by	  a	  government	  which	  confer	  a	  benefit	  can	  be	  considered	   subsidies	   as	   such	   an	   interpretation	   would	   render	   the	   list	   of	   actions	   in	  subparagraph	  (i)	  to	  (iv)	  ineffective.154	  	  	  Such	  an	  interpretation	  could	  still	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  The	  issue	  was	  discussed	  in	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  
on	  DRAMS	  and	  the	  AB	  held	  that	  the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  reflected	  a	  balance	  between	  members	  who	  wanted	  to	  discipline	  the	  use	  of	  subsidies	  and	  those	  who	  rather	  wanted	  to	  discipline	  the	  use	  of	  countervailing	  duties.155	  In	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  
IV	   the	  AB	   articulated	   on	   the	   object	   and	  purpose	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   that	   it	  was	   to	  strengthen	   and	   improve	   the	   disciplines	   on	   subsidies	   and	   countervailing	   measures	   in	  GATT	  but	  also	  to	  recognise	  that	  members	  have	  a	  right	  to	  impose	  such	  measures	  under	  particular	  circumstances.156	  The	  AB	  in	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  emphasised	  the	  importance	  of	  keeping	  the	  balance	  between	  recognising	  that	  a	  financial	  contribution	  may	  be	  made	  by	  a	  government	  through	  a	  private	  body,	  as	  is	  evidenced	  in	  article	  (iv),	  but	  also	  recognising	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  cannot	  be	  so	  broad	  as	  to	  cover	  instances	  when	  a	  government	  is	  only	  using	  its	  general	  regulatory	  powers.157	  	  	  	  The	   interpretation	   of	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   by	   AB	   in	   the	   case	   US	   –	   Countervailing	   Duty	  
Investigation	   on	   DRAMS	   resulted	   in	   the	   conclusion	   that	   entrustment	   entails	   that	   a	  government	  gives	  responsibility	  to	  a	  private	  entity	  and	  direction	  is	  when	  a	  government	  exercises	  its	  authority	  over	  a	  private	  body.	  Common	  for	  both	  the	  situations	  is	  the	  result	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  para	  114.	  154	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  para	  52,	  footnote	  35.	  	  155	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  para	  115.	  	  156	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  para	  64.	  	  157	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  para	  115.	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that	   the	  government	  has	  used	  a	  private	  entity	   in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  one	  of	   the	  specific	  financial	  contributions	  listed	  in	  article	  1.1.	  However,	  the	  AB	  also	  cautioned	  that	  it	  would	  nevertheless	   be	   difficult	   to	   identify	   which	   specific	   measures	   by	   a	   government	   would	  amount	  to	  either	  entrustment	  or	  direction	  and	  thus	  held	  that	  the	  conclusion	  will	  depend	  on	   the	   facts	   of	   each	   case.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   AB	   stated	   that	   entrustment	   and	   direction	  would	   in	   most	   cases	   include	   either	   a	   threat	   or	   an	   inducement	   in	   order	   to	   make	   the	  private	  entities	  carry	  out	  the	  actions	  and	  that	  such	  could	  serve	  as	  evidence.158	  	  	  Due	  to	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  indeed	  appear	  to	  fulfil	  the	  requirements	  outlined	  by	  the	  AB	  in	  case	  law	  of	  constituting	  of	  a	  case	  where	  a	  government	  exercises	  its	  authority	  over	  a	  private	  body	   in	  order	   to	   induce	   it	   to	  purchase	  goods,	   it	  will	  be	  of	   importance	  whether	  government	  regulation	  is	  excluded	  from	  constituting	  a	  financial	  contribution	  according	  to	   subparagraph	   (iv),	   as	   such	   a	   conclusion	  would	  mean	   that	   FITs	   financed	   by	   private	  parties	  would	   not	   be	   considered	   a	   financial	   contribution	   by	   a	   government.	   As	   can	   be	  seen	  from	  the	  discussion	  above,	  certain	  statements	  in	  case	  law	  appears	  to	  indicate	  that	  governmental	  regulation	  should	  be	  excluded.	  However,	  a	  development	   in	  case	   law	  can	  be	   seen	   where	   more	   recent	   cases,	   such	   as	   US	   –	   Countervailing	   Duty	   Investigation	   on	  
DRAMS	  has	  adopted	  a	  broader	   interpretation	  of	   the	   terms	  entrust	  and	  direct	  and	   thus	  nevertheless	  suggest	  that	  some	  governmental	  measure	  could	  be	  included	  and	  thus	  that	  also	  FIT	  regulations	  could	  be	  considered	  an	  entrustment	  or	  direction	  of	  private	  actors	  by	  a	  government.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  submitted	  that	  such	  an	  interpretation	  do	  not	  contradict	  the	   statements	   regarding	   government	   regulation	   being	   excluded	   in	   US	   –	   Exports	  
Restraints,	  as	  this	  statement	  does	  not	  necessarily	  exclude	  all	  government	  regulation	  but	  refers	  to	  regulation	  that	  only	  due	  to	  particular	  circumstances	  and	  free	  choice	  of	  actors	  would	   have	   a	   particular	   result,	   and,	   as	   explained	   in	   US	   –	   Countervailing	   Duty	  
Investigation	  on	  DRAMS,	  would	  result	  in	  an	  unintended	  effect	  by	  a	  government.	  Indeed,	  regulation	  introducing	  a	  FIT	  programme	  would	  be	  a	  more	  direct	  and	  conscious	  way	  of	  directing	  private	  actors,	  not	  leaving	  much	  choice	  for	  them.	  Thus,	  FIT	  regulation	  cannot	  be	  equated	  with	  the	  situation	  referred	  to	  in	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  as	  a	  FIT	  regulation	  does	  not	  introduce	  a	  regulation	  and	  then	  leave	  it	  to	  actors	  in	  the	  market	  to	  decide	  what	  to	   do	   but	   rather	   obligates	   actors	   to	   act	   in	   a	   certain	   way.	   In	   accordance	   with	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  US	  –	  Countervailing	  Duty	  Investigation	  on	  DRAMS	  para	  115.	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findings,	   FIT	   programmes	   must	   be	   considered	   to	   fulfil	   the	   first	   requirement	   of	  entrustment	  or	  direction	  in	  subparagraph	  (iv).	  	  	  
3.2.2.2.2	  Normally	  vested	  in	  the	  government	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   requirement	   that	   a	   private	   entity	   must	   have	   been	   entrusted	   or	  directed	   by	   a	   government	   for	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   to	   be	   applicable,	   the	   actions	   must	  moreover	  also	  normally	  be	  vested	   in	   the	  government	  and	   the	  practice	  not	  differ	   from	  practices	   normally	   followed	   by	   governments.159	   Rubini	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   this	  requirement	  that	  in	  the	  end	  most	  often	  will	  be	  decisive	  of	  whether	  a	  regulatory	  measure	  will	   be	   considered	  a	   subsidy	  or	  not.160	  With	   regards	   to	  FIT	  programmes,	   the	  question	  thus	  is	  whether	  purchasing	  of	  electricity	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  governmental	  function.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  this	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  more	  closely	  consider	  what	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  normal	  government	  practices	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  is.	  	  	  Rubini	   suggests	   that	   this	   requirement	   has	   been	   introduced	   so	   as	   not	   to	   broaden	   the	  scope	   of	   the	   financial	   contribution	   more	   than	   what	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   agreement	  intended.	  The	  term	  normal	  government	  practices	  has	  been	  interpreted	  under	  GATT,	  the	  Uruguay	  negotiations	  as	  well	  as	  under	  the	  WTO	  in	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  to	  be	  referring	  to	  government	  practices	  such	  as	  taxes	  and	  expenditure	  and	  not	  to	  include	  broad	  notions	  of	  intervention	  in	  markets	  by	  governments.161	  The	  same	  conclusion	  was	  also	  reached	  in	  
Korea	  –	  Commercial	  Vessels.162	  Such	  a	  limitation	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  would	  seem	   to	   exclude	   from	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   the	   exercise	   of	   regulatory	   power	   by	   a	  government.163	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  it	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  with	  regards	  to	  FIT	  programmes	   if	  regulation	  by	  a	  government	   is	   through	  this	  requirement	  excluded,	   as	   this	   would	   mean	   that	   FITs	   fail	   to	   fulfil	   one	   of	   the	   requirements	   in	   the	  definition	  of	  subsidy.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  1.1(a)(1)(iv).	  160	  Luca	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More:	  Subsidies	  for	  Renewable	  Energy,	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  Policy	  Space,	  and	  Law	  Reform’	  (2012)	  15	  Journal	  of	  International	  Economic	  Law	  525,	  541-­‐542.	  161	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  119.	  	  162	  Korea	  –	  Commercial	  Vessels	  para	  7.30	  and	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  16.	  	  163	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  120.	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Howse	  argues	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  would	  not	  fulfil	  the	  requirement	  precisely	  because	  FITs	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  regulation	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  rather	  than	  a	  delegation	  of	  a	  governmental	   function.	  Howse	  bases	   this	  argument	  on	   the	   interpretation	   that	   the	  requirement	   in	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   ensures	   that	   not	   all	   regulation	   that	   a	   government	  undertakes,	   which	   necessarily	   will	   impact	   on	   the	   distribution	   of	   wealth	   between	  different	  private	  actors	  to	  some	  extent,	  will	  be	  considered	  a	  subsidy.164	  	  	  Indeed,	   the	   argument	   by	  Howse	   finds	   some	   support	   in	   the	   reasoning	   in	  US	   –	   Exports	  
Restraints,	  where	  the	  panel	  underscored	  that	   the	  SCM	  Agreement	  does	  not	  necessarily	  qualify	   all	   measures,	   which	   according	   to	   economic	   theory	   would	   be	   considered	  subsidies,	   as	   subsidies	  under	   the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  The	   inclusion	  of	  a	   requirement	  of	  a	  financial	   contribution	   thus	   effectively	   limits	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement	  to	  subsidies	  as	  they	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.165	  Moreover,	  the	  panel	   in	   US	   –	   Exports	   Restraints,	   also	   found	   support	   for	   this	   interpretation	   in	   the	  negotiation	   history	   of	   the	   financial	   contribution	   requirement	   in	   article	   1	   in	   the	   SCM	  Agreement,	   which	   it	   used	   as	   supplementary	  means	   of	   interpretation.	   The	   negotiating	  history	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   shows	   that	   the	   parties	   did	   not	  mean	   for	   all	   regulatory	  measures	   introduced	   by	   governments	   to	   be	   considered	   subsidies,	   which	   is	   why	   the	  requirement	   of	   there	   to	   be	   a	   financial	   contribution	  was	   introduced	   in	   the	   text.166	   The	  parties	  to	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  a	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy	  so	  broad	  as	  to	  include	  all	  government	  measures	  conferring	  a	  benefit	  through	  introducing	  an	  exhaustive	  list	  of	  measures	  by	  governments	  that	  will	  be	  considered	  a	  subsidy.167	  Notably,	  Hufbauer	  et	  al	  argue	  that	  the	  negotiating	  history	  shows	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  subsidy	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	   drafted	   narrowly	   in	   order	   to	   exempt	   government	   regulation	   from	   being	  considered	  a	  subsidy.168	  	  Rubini	   elaborates	   on	   this	   aspect,	   and	   compares	   the	   definition	   of	   subsidy	   according	   to	  economic	   theory	   with	   the	   definition	   in	   WTO	   law,	   concluding	   that	   whereas	   from	   an	  economic	  perspective	  a	  subsidy	   is	  a	  regulatory	  measure	  which	  produces	  effects	   linked	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  Howse	  (n	  7)	  13.	  165	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  paras	  8.62-­‐8.63.	  166	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.65. 167	  US	  –	  Exports	  Restraints	  para	  8.73.	  	  168	  Gary	  Clyde	  Hufbauer,	  Steve	  Charnovitz	  and	  Jisun	  Kim,	  Global	  Warming	  and	  the	  World	  Trading	  System	  (Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics,	  2009)	  62.	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to	   subsidies,	   such	   as	   interference	   with	   prices	   and	   reallocation	   of	   resources,	   the	   legal	  definition	   is	   far	   less	   encompassing	   due	   to	   a	   balancing	   of	   underlying	   rationales	   of	  economic,	  systemic	  and	  policy	  nature.169	  	  	  However,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  that	  an	  interpretation	  limiting	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  financial	  contribution	  to	  only	  government	  practices	  relating	  to	  taxation	  and	  expenditure	   is	  very	  strict	  and	  risks	  leaving	  out	  forms	  of	  support	  that	  in	  fact	  are	  equivalent,	  and	  would	  invite	  for	   states	   to	   circumvent	   the	   law.	   Moreover,	   it	   has	   been	   suggested	   that	   such	   an	  interpretation	  would	  not	  be	  coherent	  with	  the	  case	  law	  showing	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  cost	  to	  the	  government.170	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  measures	  where	  there	   is	   no	   cost	   to	   the	   government	   could	   be	   included	   if	   financial	   contributions	   only	  extend	  to	  cover	  government	  practices	  related	  to	  expenditure	  and	  taxation.	  Thus,	  Rubini	  advocates	  an	  interpretation	  that	  is	  not	  strictly	  limited	  to	  government	  measures	  relating	  to	   expenditure	   and	   taxation	   but	   also	   includes	   closely	   related	  measures	  with	   a	   strong	  correlation	   to	  government	  practices.171	  Rubini	  argues	   that	  with	   this	   interpretation	  FIT	  programmes	  would	  fall	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.172	  	  	  	  Indeed,	   while	   both	   the	   wording	   of	   article	   1.1	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   as	   well	   as	   the	  negotiating	   history	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   indicates	   that	   certainly	   not	   all	   regulatory	  measures	   introduced	   by	   governments	   could	   be	   considered	   subsidies,	   the	   exclusion	  argued	  by	  Howse	  of	  measures	  constituting	  a	  regulation	  of	   the	  electricity	  market	   is	  not	  unproblematic.	   As	   Rubini	   holds,	   FITs	   in	   many	   ways	   lead	   to	   similar	   results	   from	   an	  economic	   perspective	   as	   do	   other	   subsidies	   and	   he	   argues	   that	   Howse’s	   distinction	  between	  delegation	  of	  a	  function	  and	  market	  regulation	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  legal	  test	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  subsidisation	   falling	  under	   the	  SCM	  Agreement	   from	  regulatory	  conduct	  falling	   outside	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement.173	   Against	   this	   backdrop,	   Rubini	  questions	   what	   aspect	   of	   FITs	   would	   make	   them	   market	   regulations	   instead	   of	   a	  delegation	  of	  function,	  as	  a	  FIT	  largely	  consists	  of	  a	  purchase	  obligation.174	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Rubini,	  Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  541.	  	  170	  See	  discussion	  below,	  section	  3.2.4.1.	  171	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  121.	  172	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  122.	  173	  Rubini,	  ‘Aint	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  542.	  	  174	  Rubini,	  ‘Aint	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  542.	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A	   broader	   interpretation	   of	   the	   requirement	   in	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   including	   also	  measures	  different	  from	  measure	  relating	  to	  taxation	  and	  expenditure	  also	  finds	  support	  in	   the	   case	  US	   –	  Antidumping	   and	  Countervailing	  Duties,	  where	   the	  AB	   considered	   the	  meaning	  of	  the	  last	  requirement	  in	  subparagraph	  (iv),	  regarding	  what	  is	  normally	  vested	  in	   the	   government	   and	   practice	   that	   in	   no	   real	   sense	   differs	   from	   practices	   normally	  followed	   by	   governments.	   The	   AB	   concluded	   that	   this	   should	   be	   judged	   on	   what	   is	  ordinarily	  considered	  part	  of	  governmental	  practice	  in	  the	  member	  state	  as	  well	  as	  the	  classification	   and	   functions	   of	   entities	   in	   WTO	   members	   generally.175	   Indeed,	   Rubini	  concludes	  that	  the	  interpretation	  in	  US	  –	  Antidumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties	  shows	  that	   cases	   of	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   cannot	   be	   limited	   to	   instances	   regarding	   taxation	   and	  expenditure,	  but	  is	  broader	  than	  that.176	  	  
	  To	   conclude,	   the	   law	   regarding	   whether	   government	   regulation	   of	   FIT	   programmes	  operated	   by	   private	   parties	   can	   be	   considered	   normal	   government	   practices	   is	   not	  entirely	  clear.	  Arguments	  can	  be	  found	  both	  in	  favour	  and	  against	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  financed	  by	  private	  parties	  should	  be	  included	  under	  subparagraph	  (iv).	  	  While	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  suggesting	  that	   the	  requirement	  of	  normal	  government	  practices	   limits	  the	   applicability	   to	   instances	   related	   to	   taxation	   and	   expenditure	   and	   thus	   would	  exclude	  FIT	  programmes	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  subparagraph	  (iv),	  the	  discussion	  above	  has	  nevertheless	   shown	   a	   development	   in	   case	   law	   with	   the	   case	   US	   –	   Antidumping	   and	  
Countervailing	  Duties	  indicating	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  provision	  might	  be	  broader.	  As	  this	  case	   indicates	   that	   the	   interpretation	  of	  normal	  government	  practices	   is	  not	   limited	  to	  only	   instances	  of	   taxation	  or	  expenditure	  but	  can	  also	  cover	  regulatory	  measures,	   this	  arguably	  means	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  are	  not	  automatically	  exempted	  due	  to	  that	  they	  are	  regulatory	  measures	  and	  thus	  this	  interpretation	  could	  potentially	  open	  up	  for	  also	  FIT	  programmes	  to	  be	  included	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  subparagraph	  (iv).	  	  	  It	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   latter,	   broader	   interpretation	   better	   reflects	   the	   balance	   of	  interests	  in	  the	  provision.	  According	  to	  Wilke	  and	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  provision	  is	  to	  reflect	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  need	  to	  hinder	  states	  from	  circumventing	   the	   provision	   using	   private	   parties,	   and	   the	   need	   for	   governments	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  US	  –	  Antidumping	  and	  Countervailing	  Duties	  para	  297	  and	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  543.	  	  176	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  15-­‐16.	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regulate	   through	   directing	   private	   parties.177	   It	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   such	   a	   broader	  interpretation	  appears	  to	  be	  more	   in	   line	  with	  this	  purpose.	   If	  all	  regulatory	  measures	  were	  excluded,	  the	  purpose	  to	  prevent	  circumvention	  of	  the	  subsidy	  regime	  by	  making	  a	  private	  entity	  providing	  the	  financial	  contribution	  would	  be	  weakened.	  	  	  In	  relation	  to	  this	  it	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  strict	  distinction	  made	  by	  Howse	  would	  lead	  to	  a	   different	   treatment	   under	  WTO	   law	   of	   subsidies	   depending	   on	   small	   differences	   in	  design	  and	  it	  can	  be	  questioned	  whether	  this	  would	  be	  appropriate.	  If	  FIT	  programmes	  were	   excluded	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   government	   regulation	   is	   not	   included	   under	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  an	  opportunity	  for	  states	  to	  circumvent	  the	  provision	  would	  open	  up.	  It	  would	  lead	  to	  that	  similar	  measures,	  only	  differing	  in	  who	  carries	  them	  out,	  would	  in	  one	  case	  be	  deemed	  to	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  and	  in	  the	  other	  would	   be	   included	   in	   the	   SCM	   Agreement.	   Moreover,	   Srikar	   has	   pointed	   out	   an	  additional	  effect	   stemming	   from	  different	   treatment	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  depending	  on	  who	  executes	  them,	  arguing	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  administered	  and	  executed	  by	  public	  bodies	   are	  more	   common	   in	   developing	   countries.	   Srikar	   points	   out	   that	   this	   leads	   to	  discrimination	   of	   developing	   countries	   and	   least	   developed	   countries	   (LDCs)	   where	  states	  traditionally	  account	  for	  more	  of	  the	  service	  provision.178	  	  	  In	  sum,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  development	  in	  case	  law	  towards	  a	  broader	  interpretation	  of	   government	   practices	   and	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   provision	   indicates	   that	   also	   FIT	  programmes	  operated	  by	  private	  parties	  could	  be	  included	  under	  subparagraph	  (iv)	  and	  thus	  be	  considered	  financial	  contributions	  by	  governments.	  	  	  
3.2.3	  Price	  support	  While	  the	  discussion	  regarding	  FIT	  programmes,	  in	  literature	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  one	  case	  concerning	   the	   issue,	   so	   far	   has	   largely	   centred	   around	   whether	   FIT	   programmes	  amount	  to	  financial	  contributions	  in	  accordance	  with	  article	  1.1(a)(1),	  it	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  also	  forms	  of	  income	  or	  price	  support	  in	  accordance	  with	  article	  1.1(a)(2)	  are	   included	   in	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   definition	   of	   a	   subsidy.	   Thus,	   this	   could	   also	   be	   a	  possibility	   for	  a	  FIT	  programme	  to	   fulfil	   the	  requirements	  of	  a	  subsidy.	  Even	  though	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  16.	  178	  Srikar	  (n	  42)	  64-­‐65.	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has	  not	  been	  discussed	  much,	  and	  in	  fact	  was	  not	  claimed	  by	  any	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  Canada	  
–	   Renewable	   Energy,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   this	   also	   could	   be	   a	   way	   of	   arguing	   that	   FIT	  programmes	  are	  included	  under	  the	  definition	  of	  subsidy	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  	  	  Income	  or	  price	   support	  are	  measures	   introduced	  by	  governments	   in	  order	   to	   sustain	  the	   income	   of	   a	   certain	   category	   of	   industries	   or	  maintain	   the	   price	   of	   a	   commodity.	  Usually	   such	   measures	   aim	   to	   prevent	   the	   price	   of	   a	   commodity	   or	   the	   income	   of	   a	  category	  to	  fall	  below	  a	  certain	  minimum	  level.	  The	  reference	  in	  the	  provision	  to	  article	  XVI	   in	   GATT	   means	   that	   the	   income	   or	   price	   support	   measure	   introduced	   by	   the	  government	  must	  operate	  to	  increase	  exports	  of	  the	  subsidised	  product	  or	  to	  decrease	  imports	  of	  similar	  products.179	  	  	  Case	  law	  under	  the	  WTO	  clarifying	  this	  provision	  is	  sparse;	  it	  has	  only	  been	  considered	  in	  two	  cases	  under	  the	  WTO.180	  In	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  the	  AB	  commented	  on	  the	  issue	   and	   concluded	   that	   the	   provision	   regarding	   price	   support	   broadens	   the	   term	  financial	   contribution	  and	  seeks	   to	   include	  other	  measures	   in	  addition	   to	   the	  measure	  outlined	  within	   the	  concept	  of	  a	   financial	  contribution.181	   	  While	   this	  suggests	  a	  broad	  scope	  of	   the	   term	  price	  support	   the	   term	  has	  also	  been	  considered	  by	  a	   later	  panel	   in	  
China	  –	  GOES.	   In	   this	   case	   the	  panel	   concluded	   that	  despite	   the	  possibility	   for	  a	  broad	  reading	  of	   the	   term	  price	   support,	   the	   context	   in	   the	  SCM	  Agreement,	   particularly	   the	  law	   regarding	   the	   scope	   of	   financial	   contribution,	   still	   suggested	   a	   more	   narrow	  interpretation.	  With	   reference	   to	   the	   law	   relating	   to	   financial	   contribution,	   the	   panel	  held	  that	  the	  focus	  needed	  to	  be	  on	  the	  measures	  taken	  by	  the	  government	  and	  not	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  measure.	  The	  panel	  concluded	  that	  the	  term	  price	  support	  was	  limited	  to	   direct	   intervention	   by	   a	   government	   in	   a	   market	   designed	   to	   fix	   the	   price	   of	   a	  commodity.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  such	  government	  action	  the	  panel	  mentioned	  policies	  of	  a	  government	  to	  purchase	  surplus	  production	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  price	  at	  a	  certain	  level.182	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  Rubini,	  The	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  123	  and	  GATT	  article	  XVI.1.	  	  180	  China	  –	  Countervailing	  and	  Anti-­Dumping	  Duties	  on	  Grain	  Oriented	  Flat-­Rolled	  Electrical	  Steel	  from	  the	  
United	  States	  (15	  June	  2012)	  WT/DS414/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (China	  –	  GOES)	  para	  7.83.	  181	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  para	  52,	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  544	  and	  Rubini,	  The	  
Definition	  of	  Subsidy	  and	  State	  Aid:	  WTO	  and	  EC	  Law	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (n	  92)	  123.	  	  182	  China	  –	  GOES	  para	  7.85.	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  Turning	  to	  FITs	  specifically,	  Rubini	  argues	  that	  FITs	  would	  qualify	  under	  the	  term	  price	  support183	  while	  Howse,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argues	  that,	  with	  regards	  to	  utilities,	  price	  regulation	  by	  a	  government	   should	  not	  be	   considered	  price	   support,	  due	   to	   that	  price	  regulation	  reflects	  various	  public	  policy	  goals,	  such	  as	  for	  example	  universal	  service,	  and	  that	   to	   consider	   price	   regulation	   of	   such	   industries	   could	   potentially	   obstruct	   the	  operation	   of	   democratic	   regulatory	   states.184	   Due	   to	   the	   very	   limited	   case	   law	   on	   the	  area	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   determine	   whether	   FIT	   programmes	   would	   be	   considered	   price	  support.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   conclusion	   by	   the	   panel	   in	   China	   –	   GOES,	   that	  government	  measures	  designed	   to	   sustain	   a	   certain	  price	   level	   for	   example	  by	  buying	  surplus	  products	  would	  be	  considered	  price	  support,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  2	  are	  designed	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  a	  certain	  price	  level	  and	  indeed	  guarantees	  that	  all	  electricity	  produced	  will	  be	  bought,	  regardless	  of	  demand,	   it	  seems	  likely	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  form	  of	  price	  support.	  	  	  	  	  
3.2.4	  Benefit	  	  A	  financial	  contribution	  by	  the	  government	  will	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  subsidy	  unless	  the	  financial	   contribution	   confers	   a	   benefit,	   as	   per	   article	   1.1(b)	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement.	  Unlike	  for	  the	  term	  financial	  contribution,	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  benefit	  is	  not	  provided	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.185	  A	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  this	  concept	  was	  provided	  by	  the	  AB	  in	  Canada	  –	  Aircraft,	  where	  the	  AB	  essentially	  held	  that	  this	  requirement	  means	  that	   the	   recipient	   of	   a	   financial	   contribution	   have	   to	   be	   better	   off	   than	   it	  would	   have	  been	   without	   the	   financial	   contribution.186	   Likewise	   in	  US	   –	   Large	   Civil	   Aircraft	   (2nd	  
Complaint)	   the	  AB	  noted	  that	   the	  assessment	  of	  whether	  a	  benefit	  had	  been	  conferred	  aimed	   to	   clarify	   whether	   the	   recipient	   was	   better	   off	   with	   the	   financial	   contribution	  compared	  to	  what	  the	  recipient	  would	  have	  been	  without	  it.187	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  544.	  184	  Howse	  (n	  7)	  13.	  185	  Gilbert	  Gagné	  and	  François	  Roch,	  ‘The	  US-­‐Canada	  Softwood	  Lumber	  Dispute	  and	  the	  WTO	  Definition	  of	  Subsidy’	  (2008)	  7	  World	  Trade	  Review	  547,	  521.	  186	  Canada	  –	  Aircraft	  para	  157,	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  545,	  Trebilcock	  (n	  85)	  82	  and,	  Trebilcock	  and	  Fishbein	  (n	  82)	  21.	  	  187	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  761.	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In	   some	  cases	   this	  assessment	   is	   simple,	   as	   for	  example	  when	  a	  government	   transfers	  money	  directly	  to	  an	  enterprise	  or	  when	  a	  government	  has	  been	  foregoing	  revenue	  that	  it	  would	  normally	  have	  collected.	  However,	  in	  other	  cases,	  such	  as	  when	  a	  government	  provides	  a	  loan	  for	  a	  company	  or,	   indeed,	  when	  a	  government	  purchases	  goods	  from	  a	  company,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  as	  obvious	  whether	  a	  benefit	  has	  been	  conferred.188	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   determine	   whether	   a	   benefit	   has	   been	   conferred,	   i.e.	   whether	   a	   financial	  contribution	  has	  resulted	   in	  a	  more	  advantageous	  position	   for	   the	  recipient,	   the	  AB	   in	  
Canada	   –	   Aircraft	   held	   that	   an	   assessment	   is	   to	   be	   made	   of	   whether	   the	   recipient	  received	  the	  financial	  contribution	  on	  terms	  more	  favourable	  than	  those	  available	  in	  the	  market.189	   That	   the	   marketplace	   is	   to	   be	   used	   as	   a	   standard	   has	   been	   confirmed	   in	  several	  cases	  decided	  by	  the	  AB.190	  In	  making	  this	  determination,	  earlier	  panels	  and	  the	  AB	   has	   found	   that	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   make	   a	   comparison	   with	   a	   market	   benchmark	  reflecting	  the	  prevailing	  market	  conditions.191	  The	  AB	  has	  explained	  the	  methodology	  to	  consist	  of	  two	  steps.	  In	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  conclusion	  on	  the	  particular	  market	  benchmark	  it	   is	   first	   necessary	   to	   determine	  what	   the	   relevant	  market	   is	   and	   then	   to	  within	   this	  market	  find	  an	  appropriate	  benchmark.192	  	  	  	  	  	  It	   will,	   however,	   in	   many	   cases	   be	   difficult	   to	   find	   a	   proper	   undistorted	   market	  benchmark,	  which	  was	  recognised	  by	   the	  AB	   in	   Japan	  –	  DRAMS.193	   In	   this	  case,	   the	  AB	  noted	   that	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   markets	   have	   been	   developed	   and	   the	   number	   of	  participants	  will	  vary	  between	  markets	  and	  that	  it	  may	  in	  some	  markets	  be	  difficult	  to	  establish	  what	  the	  relevant	  market	  is	  and	  determine	  the	  results	  from	  such	  a	  market,	  as	  prices	   for	   example	  may	  have	   been	  distorted.194	  Nevertheless,	   the	  AB	   emphasised	   that	  such	  constraints	  cannot	  alter	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  analysis	  and	  that	  ‘There	  is	  but	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  760	  and	  Rubini,	  ‘Aint	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  545.	  	  189	  Canada	  –	  Aircraft	  para	  157.	  	  190	   Japan	  –	  Countervailing	  Duties	  on	  Dynamic	  Random	  Access	  Memories	   from	  Korea	   (17	  December	  2007)	  WT/DS336/AB/R	   <http://docsonline.wto.org>	   	   (Japan	   –	   DRAMS)	  para	   172,	  European	   Communities	   and	  
Certain	  Member	  States	  –	  Measures	  Affecting	  Trade	  in	  Large	  Civil	  Aircraft	  (18	  May	  2011)	  WT/DS316/AB/R	  <http://docsonline.wto.org>	  (EC	  –	  Large	  Civil	  Aircraft)	  paras	  974-­‐976	  and	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  545.	  	  191	  Lowenfeld	  (n	  81)	  242.	  	  192	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.169.	  193	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  762.	  	  194	  Japan	  –	  DRAMS	  para	  172.	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standard	  –	  the	  market	  standard	  –	  according	  to	  which	  rational	  investors	  act.’195	  	  Thus,	  the	  marketplace	   has	   been	   identified	   by	   the	   AB	   to	   be	   the	   relevant	   focus	   in	   determining	  whether	   a	   benefit	   has	   been	   conferred,	   and	   this	   applies	   equally	   regardless	   of	   the	  characteristics	  or	  imperfections	  that	  might	  exist	  in	  a	  particular	  market.196	  This	  issue	  was	  also	   raised	   in	   US	   –	   Softwood	   Lumber	   IV,	   where	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   due	   to	   the	  interventions	   in	   the	   Canadian	   market	   by	   the	   Canadian	   government,	   the	   market	  conditions	  in	  Canada	  did	  not	  reflect	  a	  fair	  market	  value	  of	  timber.	  The	  AB	  then	  opened	  up	  the	  possibility	  for	  using	  other	  benchmarks	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  distorted	  market.197	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  AB	  found	  that	  the	  benchmark	  could	  only	  be	  based	  on	  prices	  other	  than	  private	  prices	  in	  the	  country	  if	  it	  has	  been	  established	  that	  the	  government’s	  role	  as	  provider	  of	  the	  good	  in	  the	  market	  distorts	  those	  prices.198	  	  	  	  
3.2.4.1	  Financing	  of	  FITs	  With	  regards	  to	  FIT	  programmes,	  a	  first	  interesting	  question	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  conferral	  of	  a	  benefit	   is	  whether	  it	  necessarily	  requires	  a	  cost	  to	  the	  government.	  This	  will	  be	  of	  particular	  importance	  in	  situations	  where	  the	  design	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  government	  itself	  bears	  the	  cost,	  such	  as	  is	  the	  case	  when	  the	  government	  only	  through	   regulation	  directs	   private	   entities	   to	   buy	   electricity	   at	   a	   certain	   tariff	   level	   as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2.	  If	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  benefit	  necessarily	  includes	  a	  requirement	  for	  there	   to	   be	   cost	   for	   the	   government,	   such	   programmes	   would	   not	   be	   considered	   to	  confer	  a	  benefit	  and	  such	  FIT	  programmes	  would	  as	  a	  result	  not	  fulfil	   the	  definition	  of	  subsidy	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  	  	  In	   Canada	   -­	   Aircraft	   the	   AB	   found	   that	  whether	   a	   benefit	   has	   been	   conferred	   is	   to	   be	  determined	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   recipient	   and	   is	   not,	   as	   Canada	   had	   argued,	  dependent	  on	  whether	   the	  granting	  authority	  has	  borne	  a	  cost.199	  The	  AB	   in	  Canada	  –	  
Aircraft	  based	  its	  reasoning	  on	  the	  ordinary	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  benefit	  –	  which	  the	  AB	  found	   to	   include	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   recipient	   –	   and	   a	   reading	   of	   article	   14	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement,	  which	   stipulates	  how	   to	   calculate	   the	   size	   of	   a	   subsidy,	   and	  which	   the	  AB	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  Japan	  –	  DRAMS	  para	  172.	  196	  Rubini,	  ‘What	  does	  the	  recent	  WTO	  litigation	  on	  renewable	  energy	  subsidies	  tell	  us	  about	  methodology	  in	  legal	  analysis?’	  (n	  87)	  10.	  	  	  197	  Trebilcock	  (n	  85)	  83.	  	  198	  Gagné	  and	  Roche	  (n	  185)	  569.	  199	  Canada	  –	  Aircraft	  para	  160	  and	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  760.	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found	   to	   support	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   recipient	   of	   the	   benefit	   as	   article	   14	   refers	   to	   the	  amount	  of	  subsidy	  as	  the	  benefit	  to	  the	  recipient.200	  	  	  Of	   particular	   importance	   to	   the	   assessment	   of	   FIT	   programmes	   is	   the	   AB’s	   next	  argument,	  that	  an	  interpretation	  of	  benefit	  which	  required	  a	  cost	  to	  the	  government,	  as	  argued	   by	   Canada,	   would	   mean	   that	   situations	   in	   which	   a	   government	   directs	   or	  entrusts	   a	   private	   body	   to	   confer	   a	   benefit	   were	   excluded	   from	   the	   scope	   of	   article	  1.1(a)(1),	   as	   in	   those	   situations	   there	  would	  not	  be	   a	   cost	   to	   the	   government.	  The	  AB	  found	  that	  such	  an	  interpretation	  would	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  wording	  of	  article	  1.1(a)(1)	  which	   in	   subparagraph	   (iv)	   explicitly	   includes	   within	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   financial	  contribution	  such	  situations	  and	  the	  AB	  thus	  disagreed	  with	  the	  interpretation	  advanced	  by	  Canada,	  clarifying	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  subsidy	  also	  includes	  situations	  where	  there	  is	  no	  cost	  to	  the	  government.201	  	  	  While	  the	  situation	  where	  a	  government	  directs	  private	  entities	  to	  purchase	  goods	  at	  a	  favourable	   price	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   government	   bears	   any	   cost	   itself	   for	   the	  purchase,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   this	   does	   not	   exclude	   such	  measures	   from	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.202	  From	  the	  discussion	  above	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that,	  indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  design	  of	  a	  FIT	  programme	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  government	  bears	  the	  costs	  for	  the	   benefit,	   such	   as	   when	   the	   government	   directs	   private	   bodies	   to	   execute	   the	   FIT	  programme,	  does	  not	  exclude	  the	  FIT	  programme	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  The	  reasoning	  by	  the	  AB	  in	  Canada	  –	  Aircraft	  clearly	  shows	  that	  actions	  by	  a	  government	  can	  confer	  benefits	  even	  though	  the	  government	  has	  borne	  no	  cost.	  This	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	   to	   the	   discussion	   of	  whether	   FIT	   programmes	   are	   specific	   subsidies,	   as	   a	  finding	   that	   the	   conferral	   of	   a	   benefit	   requires	   a	   cost	   to	   the	   government	   would	  necessarily	  have	  excluded	  FIT	  programmes	  financed	  by	  private	  parties	   from	  the	  ambit	  of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  However,	  with	  the	   finding	  that	  a	  cost	   to	   the	  government	   is	  not	  necessary	   for	   a	   measure	   to	   constitute	   a	   subsidy,	   it	   can	   be	   concluded	   that	   FIT	  programmes,	  regardless	  of	  how	  they	  are	  financed,	  are	  not	  automatically	  exempted	  from	  the	  definition	  of	  subsidy	  on	  this	  basis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  Canada	  –	  Aircraft	  paras	  154	  and	  155.	  	  201	  Canada	  –	  Aircraft	  para	  160.	  202	  Howse	  (n	  7)	  12.	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3.2.4.2	  The	  tariff	  level	  Having	  established	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  benefit	  does	  not	  require	  a	  cost	  to	  the	  government,	  and	  thus	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  are	  not	  excluded	  on	  this	  basis,	  the	  dissertation	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  an	  assessment	  of	  whether	  FIT	  programmes,	  as	  defined	  above	  in	  chapter	  2,	  confer	  a	  benefit.	  The	  assessment	  of	  whether	  a	  FIT	  programme	  confers	  a	  benefit	  will	  essentially	  hinge	   on	  whether	   it	   provides	   an	   advantage	   to	   the	   recipient	   compared	   to	   the	   general	  conditions	  available	  on	  the	  market,	  and	  shall	  be	  determined	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  case	  law	  accounted	  for	  above.	  Thus,	  the	  crucial	  issue	  would	  be	  whether	  the	  conditions	  in	  the	  FIT	   contracts	   are	   more	   favourable	   than	   conditions	   available	   to	   producers	   in	   the	  marketplace.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  FIT	  programmes	  confer	  a	  benefit	  it	  is	  thus	  necessary	  to	  compare	  the	  conditions	  in	  FIT	  contracts	  with	  the	  conditions	  that	  would	  be	  available	  on	  the	  market.	  While	  the	  long	  duration	  of	  the	  contract	  could	  prove	  problematic	  if	  it	  would	  be	   found	   to	  be	   longer	   than	   for	  other	   contracts	   available	   in	   the	  market	   and	   thus	   could	  confer	  a	  benefit,	  the	  aspect	  in	  FIT	  programmes	  that	  above	  all	  could	  prove	  problematic	  in	  that	   it	  risks	  conferring	  a	  benefit	   is	   the	  tariff	   level,	  as	   it	   is	  usually	  set	  above	  the	  market	  rate	  for	  electricity	  from	  conventional	  sources	  as	  concluded	  in	  chapter	  2.	  Therefore,	  this	  section	  will	  consider	  this	  issue.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  such	  conditions	  mean	  that	  a	  benefit	  has	  been	  provided,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  know	  what	   is	   the	  relevant	  market	  and	  market	  benchmark.	  	  	  	  Guidance	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   article	   14(d)	   in	   the	   SCM	  Agreement,	   concerning	   how	   to	  calculate	   the	   amount	   of	   subsidy,	   which	   has	   been	   used	   in	   for	   instance	   EC	   –DRAMS	   to	  determine	  whether	  a	  benefit	  has	  been	  conferred.203	  This	  provision	  holds	  that	  a	  purchase	  of	   goods	   should	   be	   considered	   a	   benefit	   if	   it	   is	   made	   for	   more	   than	   adequate	  remuneration	  and	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  remuneration	  is	  to	  be	  determined	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  prevailing	  market	  conditions.204	  	  Consequently,	  seeing	  as	  FIT	  programmes	  consist	  of	  a	  purchase	  of	  goods,	  the	  decisive	  issue	  for	  the	  determination	  of	  a	  benefit	  will	  be	  whether	  the	  purchase	  is	  made	  for	  more	  than	  what	  it	  would	  have	  yielded	  under	  prevailing	  market	  conditions.	   In	  accordance	  with	  the	  methodology	  explained	  above	  this	  has	  to	  be	  settled	  through	  a	  comparison	  with	  a	  market	  benchmark.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  Lowenfeld	  (n	  81)	  242.	  204	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  14(d)	  and	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.183.	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  The	   question	   of	  whether	   FIT	   programmes	  provide	   a	   benefit	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   tariff	  level	  might	  at	  a	  first	  glance	  seem	  to	  be	  easily	  answered	  in	  the	  positive,	  as	  the	  tariff	  level	  usually	  is	  set	  higher	  than	  the	  market	  price	  for	  electricity	  from	  conventional	  sources.	  	  It	  has	   indeed	  been	  argued	  by	  authors	  that	   the	  tariff	   level	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  means	  that	  FIT	   programmes	   by	   definition	   provide	   a	   benefit.205	   Moreover,	   Rubini	   claims	   that	   the	  assessment	   of	   a	   benefit	   in	   the	   first	   stage,	   i.e.	   in	   the	   determination	   of	   whether	   the	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy	  has	  been	  fulfilled,	  is	  a	  limited	  assessment,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  extensive	  assessment	  that	  will	  have	  to	  be	  undertaken	  in	  the	  course	  of	  determining	  the	  effects	  on	  trade	  of	  the	  subsidy	  and	  that	  in	  the	  first	  determination	  such	  concerns	  should	  be	   exempted	   from	   scrutiny.206	   Howse	   argues	   that	   whether	   FIT	   programmes	   are	  conferring	  a	  benefit	  or	  not	  are	  likely	  to	  vary	  between	  different	  FIT	  programmes.	  Howse	  is	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   not	   all	   FIT	  programmes	  will	   include	   a	   conferral	   of	   a	   benefit.	  He	  claims	  that	  when	  measures	   introduced	  by	  a	  government	  only	  compensates	  a	  producer	  for	  actions	  which	  the	  producer	  otherwise	  would	  not	  have	   to	   take,	  such	  as	   investing	   in	  equipment	   for	   producing	   renewable	   energy	  or	   distributing	   electricity	   from	   renewable	  sources	  to	  customers	  in	  remote	  areas,	  the	  producer	  has	  only	  received	  compensation	  for	  costs	   and	  a	  benefit	  has	  not	  been	   conferred.	  The	  argument	   is	  based	  on	   the	  notion	   that	  such	  measures	  do	  not	   leave	  the	  recipient	  better	  off	  than	  any	  other	  actor	  in	  the	  market	  that	  has	  not	  had	  to	  undertake	  the	  actions	  that	  the	  recipient	  has.207	  In	  relation	  to	  this,	  the	  argument	   has	   been	   advanced	   that	   the	   determination	   of	   whether	   a	   benefit	   has	   been	  conferred	   ought	   to	   be	   done	   in	   relation	   to	   other	   regulatory	   requirements,	   as	   such	  requirements	   may	   have	   introduced	   a	   competitive	   disadvantage	   on	   the	   producer.	   For	  instance,	  this	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  in	  states	  with	  very	  strict	  environmental	  regulations,	  support	  measures	  by	  governments	  may	  only	  compensate	  for	  the	  extra	  cost	  on	  producers	  due	  to	  the	  strict	  regulations.208	  	  	  However,	  it	  is	  submitted	  that	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  whether	  FIT	  programmes	  provide	  a	  benefit,	   the	  methodology	   for	   the	  benefit	  determination	  accounted	   for	   above	  suggests	  that	  the	  comparison	  must	  be	  made	  against	  a	  market	  benchmark	  before	  such	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  See	  for	  example	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  17.	  	  206	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  546.	  207	  Howse	  (n	  7)	  13.	  	  208	  Bigdeli	  (n	  17)	  15.	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conclusion	  can	  be	  reached.	  For	  the	  outcome	  of	  such	  an	  assessment	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  will	  be	  of	  utmost	  importance	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  from	  case	  law	  below.	  	  	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   FIT	   programmes	   only	   one	   case	   has	   been	   tried	   by	   the	   AB,	   namely	  
Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy,	  and	  in	  this	  case	   it	  was	   in	   fact	  whether	  a	  benefit	  had	  been	  conferred	  that	  proved	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  determine	  and	  also	  the	  criterion	  on	  which	  the	  claim	  eventually	   fell.	  The	  case	  provides	   important	   insights	   into	   the	  benefit	  assessment	  with	  regards	  to	  FIT	  programmes.	  	  	  In	  Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy,	   a	   case	   brought	   by	   EU	   and	   Japan,	   the	   AB	   analysed	   the	  WTO	  compatibility	  of	  a	  FIT	  programme	  introduced	  by	  Ontario,	  Canada.	  In	  the	  disputes	  the	  complainants	  challenged	  certain	  aspects	  of	  Canada’s	  FIT	  programme.	  Implemented	  by	   the	   government	   of	   the	   province	   of	   Ontario	   in	   2009	   to	   increase	   the	   supply	   of	  electricity	   generated	   from	   renewable	   sources,	   the	   FIT	   programme	   guaranteed	   to	  producers	  of	  electricity	  from	  renewable	  sources	  a	  certain	  price	  per	  kWh	  for	  electricity	  for	  a	  contract	  period	  of	  20	  to	  40	  years.	  The	  FIT	  programme	  was	  open	  to	  producers	   in	  Ontario	   generating	   electricity	   from	   the	   renewable	   sources	   wind,	   solar	   PV,	   renewable	  biomass,	   biogas,	   landfill	   gas,	   and	   waterpower.	   The	   FIT	   programme	   included	   both	  producers	  with	  a	   capacity	   to	  generate	   large	  quantities	  of	   electricity	  as	  well	   as	   smaller	  producers	  such	  as	  farms	  and	  homeowners.209	  The	  Ontario	  FIT	  Programme	  also	  included	  local	  content	  requirements,	   thus	  conditioning	  eligibility	   for	   the	  FIT	  programme	  on	   the	  use	   of	   locally	   produced	   content	   in	   the	   development	   and	   construction	   of	   production	  facilities.210	   	   In	   both	   the	   disputes	   the	   claimants	   held	   Canada’s	   FIT	   programme	   to	   be	  inconsistent	  with	  certain	  articles	  in	  the	  TRIMS	  Agreement	  and	  the	  GATT,	  but	  also	  to	  be	  inconsistent	  with	   article	   3.1(b)	   and	   3.2	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.211	   Arguably,	   the	   claim	  under	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   was	   particularly	   relevant	   to	   the	   claimants	   as	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   under	   article	   4.7	   provides	   for	   a	  more	   rapid	   remedy	   than	   does	   the	  DSU.212	  The	  case	  particularly	  provides	  for	  important	  conclusions	  for	  FIT	  programmes	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  relevant	  market.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  paras	  1.3	  and	  4.17.	  	  210	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  1.4.	  211	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  1.6.	  212	  Rajib	  Pal,	   ‘Has	  the	  Appellate	  Body’s	  Decision	  in	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  /	  Canada	  –	  Feed-­in	  Tariff	  
Program	  Opened	   the	  Door	   for	   Production	   Subsidies?’	   (2014)	   17	   Journal	   of	   International	   Economic	   Law	  125,	  127.	  See	  also	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  4.7.	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3.2.4.2.1	  The	  relevant	  market	  	  In	  accordance	  with	   the	  methodology	  described	  above,	   the	  determination	  of	  whether	  a	  benefit	   had	   been	   conferred	   in	   Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   was	   to	   be	   decided	   in	  comparison	   with	   a	   market	   benchmark.	   The	   AB	   started	   with	   defining	   the	   relevant	  market.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  AB	  disagreed	  with	  the	  finding	  of	  the	  panel	  -­‐	  that	  the	  relevant	  market	  was	   the	  market	   for	  electricity	   from	  all	   sources	  of	   energy,	   as	   customers	  do	  not	  distinguish	   between	   electricity	   based	   on	   the	   mode	   of	   generation213	   -­‐	   after	   having	  examined	  both	  demand-­‐side	  and	  supply-­‐side	  factors.214	  The	  AB	  criticised	  the	  panel	   for	  finding	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   electricity	   is	   physically	   the	   same	   regardless	   of	   how	   it	   is	  produced	  means	   that	   there	   is	  only	  one	  market	   for	  electricity.	  The	  AB	  pointed	  out	   that	  this	   only	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	   high	   demand-­‐side	   substitutability	   but	   the	   AB	   also	  emphasised	   the	   need	   to	   analyse	   supply-­‐side	   factors	   when	   determining	   the	   relevant	  market.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  AB	  cited	  EC	  and	  Certain	  Member	  States	  –	  Large	  Civil	  Aircraft,	  even	  though	  that	  case	  regarded	  an	  assessment	  pursuant	  to	  articles	  6.3(a)	  and	  6.3(b)	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  where	  both	  demand-­‐side	  and	  supply-­‐side	  substitutability	  was	  used	  by	  the	  AB	  to	  determine	  the	  relevant	  market.215	  	  	  The	  emphasis	  of	  the	  AB	  on	  supply-­‐side	  factors	  will	  prove	  of	  utmost	  importance	  for	  the	  benefit	  determination	  with	  regards	  to	  FITs.	  In	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  the	  AB	  noted	  that	   certain	   supply-­‐side	   factors	  with	   regards	   to	   renewable	  energy,	   such	  as	   the	   type	  of	  energy	   generated	   (i.e.	   base-­‐load	   or	   peak-­‐load),	   had	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   and	   that	  such	   factors	   might	   in	   fact	   differentiate	   the	   market,	   even	   though	   demand-­‐side	   factors	  may	   indicate	   that	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   between	   electricity	   from	   renewable	   and	  conventional	   sources.216	  The	  AB	  argued	   that	   from	  an	   analysis	   of	   both	  demand-­‐side	   as	  well	  as	  supply-­‐side	  factors	  follows	  that	  the	  intervention	  in	  the	  market	  by	  a	  government	  can	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market.217	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.168.	  214	  Pal	  (n	  212)	  127.	  215	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.171.	  216	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.170-­‐5.171.	  217	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.172.	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Indeed,	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   one	   of	   the	  most	   important	   findings	  with	   regards	   to	   the	  WTO	  consistency	  of	  FIT	  programmes	  regarded	  precisely	  the	  significance	  of	  government	  intervention	  in	  the	  market	  for	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  relevant	  market.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  AB	  noted	  that	  the	  electricity	  market	  in	  Ontario	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  policy	  decisions	  and	  regulations	  regarding	  the	  supply	  mix.218	  The	  AB	  found	  that	  due	  to	  several	  factors,	   such	   as	   high	   capital	   costs,	   few	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	   inferior	   suitability	   for	  certain	   types	  of	  energy	  production,	   solar	  and	  wind	  energy	  cannot	  compete	  with	  other	  energy	  generating	  technologies.	  Therefore,	  the	  AB	  concluded	  that	  markets	  for	  wind	  and	  solar	   energy	   could	   only	   come	   into	   existence	   as	   a	   result	   of	   government	   intervention,	  through	   for	   example	   the	   government	   determining	   prices	   for	   renewable	   energy	   or	  requiring	  distributors	   to	  buy	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  renewable	  energy.	   In	  respect	   to	   this,	  the	   AB	   noted	   that	   only	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   certain	   supply-­‐mix	   definition	   by	   the	  government	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  amount	  to	  a	  benefit.219	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   AB	   opposed	   the	   panel’s	   focus	   on	   that	   final	   consumers	   do	   not	  distinguish	  between	  electricity	  based	  on	  the	  generation	  technology.	  The	  AB	  pointed	  out	  that	  while	  final	  consumers	  may	  perceive	  electricity	  as	  the	  same	  regardless	  of	  generation	  technology,	   the	   same	   was	   not	   necessarily	   true	   at	   the	   wholesale	   level,	   where	   the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  purchased	  electricity	  based	  on	  its	  supply-­‐mix	  decisions.	  Thus,	  for	  the	   government	   of	   Ontario,	   electricity	   from	   different	   generating	   technologies	  was	   not	  substitutable.220	   The	   AB	   concluded	   that,	   although	   demand-­‐side	   factors	   weighed	   in	  favour	   of	   defining	   the	   relevant	  market	   as	   the	   electricity	  market	   in	  whole,	   supply-­‐side	  factors	   showed	   that	   a	   wind	   and	   solar	   electricity	   market	   would	   not	   exist	   without	  government	   intervention	   and	   thus	   the	   assessment	   of	   whether	   a	   benefit	   had	   been	  conferred	   should	   be	   made	   within	   a	   competitive	   market	   for	   wind	   and	   solar	   energy	  created	  by	  the	  governments	  definition	  of	  the	  supply-­‐mix.221	  Thus,	  the	  focus	  by	  the	  AB	  in	  
Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   on	   supply-­‐side	   factors	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   government	  intervention	  was	  necessary	   to	  create	  a	  market	   for	  renewable	  energy	  production	  made	  the	  AB	  concluded	  that	  the	  relevant	  market	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  whether	  a	  benefit	  had	  been	  conferred	  was	  the	  market	  for	  wind	  and	  solar	  power.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.173.	  219	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  paras	  5.174-­‐5.175.	  220	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.176.	  221	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.178.	  
54	  
	  
3.2.4.2.2	  The	  market	  benchmark	  	  Having	   found	   the	  relevant	  market	   to	  be	  competitive	  wind	  and	  solar	  power	  markets	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   reasoning	   above,	   the	   AB	   moved	   on	   to	   establish	   the	   benchmark	  against	  which	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  benefit	  should	  be	  assessed.222	  	  Embarking	  on	  the	  benchmark	  analysis,	  the	  AB	  noted	  that	  article	  1.1(b)	  should	  be	  read	  in	  the	  context	  of	  article	  14(d)	  and	  that	  it	  involved	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  alleged	  subsidy	  with	  a	   benchmark.	   Referring	   to	  US	   –	   Softwood	   Lumber	   IV,	   the	   AB	   underscored	   that,	   in	   the	  absence	   of	   an	   undistorted	   market	   in	   the	   country	   of	   purchase,	   the	   assessment	   shall	  instead	   be	   done	   in	   comparison	   with	   an	   out-­‐of-­‐country	   market	   or	   a	   constructed	  benchmark	   that	   replicates	   competitive	  market	   conditions.	  However,	   the	  AB	   cautioned	  that	   the	   new	   benchmark	   truly	   must	   reflect	   the	   market	   conditions	   in	   the	   country	   of	  purchase,	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  AB	  in	  Canada	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV.223	  	  	  The	  case	  law	  concerning	  the	  determination	  of	  a	  benefit	  in	  distorted	  markets	  appears	  to	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  with	  regards	  to	  FITs,	  because,	  as	  Rubini	  explains,	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  benchmark	   in	   energy	  markets	  might	   be	   difficult	   due	   to	   that	   those	  markets	   have	   to	   a	  great	  extent	  been	  subject	  to	  government	  intervention.224	  Howse,	  who	  has	  elaborated	  on	  this	   aspect,	   argues	   that	   energy	   markets	   have	   during	   extensive	   time	   periods	   been	  distorted	   by	   subsidies	   from	   governments	   for	   fossil	   fuels	   to	   both	   producers	   and	  consumers	  and	  moreover	  that	  also	  physical	  properties	   for	  distribution	  and	  retailing	  of	  energy,	  such	  as	  electricity	  grids,	  favour	  fossil	  fuels.225	  	  Thus,	  authors	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  would	  prove	  problematic	  to	  find	  an	  undistorted	  benchmark	  in	  energy	  markets.	  	  	  	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   in	   Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   the	   AB	   emphasised	   that	   government	  intervention	   in	   energy	   markets	   not	   necessarily	   meant	   that	   appropriate	   benchmarks	  could	   not	   be	   found	   in	   such	   markets	   and	   that	   this	   applied	   also	   to	   instances	   where	   a	  government	   has	   created	   a	   market.	   To	   illustrate	   this	   point,	   the	   AB	   mentioned	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.179.	  223	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.184.	  	  224	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  545.	  225	  Howse	  (n	  7)	  6.	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governments	  often	  intervene	  in	  electricity	  markets	  to	  create	  a	  market	  with	  constant	  and	  reliable	   supply,	   through	   for	   example	   regulating	   the	   quantity	   and	   type	   of	   electricity	  supplied	  such	  as	  base-­‐load,	  peak-­‐load	  and	  intermediate-­‐load.	  Although	  this	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  prices,	  just	  like	  the	  creation	  of	  renewable	  energy	  markets	  may,	  the	  AB	  did	  not	  find	  it	  to	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  treat	  such	  prices	  as	  market	  prices	  in	  a	  benefit	  analysis.226	  	  	  It	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   another	   important	   finding	   with	   regards	   to	   government	  intervention	  in	  markets	  was	  that	  the	  AB	  recognised	  that	  regulation	  of	  the	  supply-­‐mix	  to	  include	  renewable	  energy,	  just	  like	  interventions	  directed	  at	  ensuring	  a	  reliable	  supply	  of	   electricity,	   could	   be	   important	   for	   the	   long-­‐term	   sustainability	   of	   the	   electricity	  market,	  as	  the	  alternative	  may	  be	  reliance	  on	  exhaustible	  energy	  sources	  such	  as	  fossil	  fuel,	   which	   is	   not	   sustainable	   from	   a	   long-­‐term	   perspective.	   The	   AB	   concluded	   that	   a	  government’s	  choice	  to	  include	  wind	  and	  solar	  energy	  into	  the	  supply	  mix	  should	  not	  be	  considered	   to	   prevent	   a	   benchmark	   from	   the	  market	   to	   be	   used	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	  whether	   a	   benefit	   has	   been	   conferred.227	   However,	   the	   AB	   emphasised	   that	   it	   is	   still	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  when	  a	  government	  creates	  a	  market	  that	  would	  not	  exist	  without	  government	  intervention,	  and	  when	  a	  government	  supports	  players	  in	  an	  already	  existing	  market.228	  While	  the	  AB	  recognised	  that	  the	  supply-­‐mix	  definition	  by	  a	  government	   could	   be	   of	   importance	   when	   determining	   the	   benchmark,	   the	   AB	  nevertheless	   strongly	   emphasised	   that	   the	   underlying	   policy	   objectives	   for	   the	  introduction	   of	   such	   a	   supply-­‐mix	   was	   of	   no	   importance,	   as	   taking	   that	   into	   account	  would	  have	  been	  equal	  of	  introducing	  an	  exception	  based	  on	  environmental	  grounds	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.229	  	  	  The	  AB	  found	  that	  the	  benchmark	  for	  wind	  and	  solar	  electricity	  should	  be	  found	  in	  the	  market	   for	   solar	   and	   wind	   energy	   resulting	   from	   the	   supply-­‐mix	   definition.	   The	   AB	  concluded	   that	   a	   benchmark	   should	   be	   the	   terms	   and	   conditions	   available	   under	  market-­‐based	  conditions	  for	  each	  of	  the	  technologies,	  with	  the	  supply-­‐mix	  considered	  as	  a	  prerequisite.230	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  paras	  5.185.	  227	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.186.	  228	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.188.	  229	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.182.	  230	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.190.	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Assessing	  the	  benchmarks	  suggested	  by	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute,	  the	  AB	  found	  none	  of	  them	   to	   be	   appropriate,	   as	   they	   all	   reflected	   a	   price	   for	   electricity	   from	   blended	  sources.231	   The	   AB	   concluded	   that	   an	   appropriate	   benchmark	   would	   reflect	   what	  electricity	  produced	  from	  wind	  and	  solar	  power	  would	  yield,	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Ontario’s	  definition	  of	  the	  supply-­‐mix.232	  	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  AB	  in	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  found	  itself	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  complete	  the	  legal	   analysis	   due	   to	   that	   sufficient	   evidence	   of	   a	   market	   benchmark	   had	   not	   been	  presented	  by	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute,	  233	  the	  AB	  nevertheless	  in	  its	  reasoning	  provided	  important	  information	  for	  the	  benefit	  determination	  in	  relation	  to	  FIT	  programmes.	  The	  AB	  found	  that	  the	  appropriate	  benchmark	  for	  the	  benefit	  analysis	  could	  be	  administered	  prices	  for	  the	  same	  product,	  if	  those	  prices	  are	  determined	  by	  a	  price-­‐setting	  mechanism	  ensuring	  market	  prices,	  or	  prices	  determined	  through	  competitive	  bidding	  or	  negotiated	  prices,	  in	  case	  these	  prices	  reflected	  the	  lowest	  possible	  price	  offered.234	  	  	  	  	  Thus,	   the	   reasoning	   by	   the	   AB	   in	   Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   provides	   important	  information	   as	   to	   the	  benefit	   determination	   from	  FIT	  programmes,	   in	   that	   it	   provides	  insights	   into	   the	   determination	   of	   appropriate	   market	   benchmarks	   in	   relation	   to	   FIT	  programmes.	  	  
	  The	   decision	   in	   Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   has	   however	   been	   criticised	   by	   several	  authors	   claiming	   that	   the	   AB	   in	   its	   eagerness	   not	   to	   find	   renewable	   energy	   subsidies	  inconsistent	  with	  the	   law	  of	   the	  WTO	  committed	  several	  errors	   in	   its	   interpretation	  of	  the	   term	  benefit	  and	   in	   the	   finding	  of	   the	  market	  benchmark.	  Moreover,	   the	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  AB	  to	  the	  term	  benefit	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  giving	  member	  states	   large	  space	  to	  subsidise	  production	  also	  in	  other	  industries.	  	  	  For	  instance,	  Pal	  argues	  that	  the	  emphasis	  put	  on	  supply-­‐side	  factors	  by	  the	  AB,	  leading	  it	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  relevant	  market	  was	  not	  the	  blended	  electricity	  market	  but	  rather	  the	  market	  for	  wind	  and	  solar	  power,	  was	  erroneous.	  In	  support	  of	  this,	  Pal	  argues	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.204.	  232	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.227.	  233	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.246.	  234	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.228.	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the	   case	   law	   the	   AB	   included	   in	   its	   argument	   of	   supply-­‐side	   factors	   referred	   to	   a	  provision	  in	  a	  distinctly	  different	  context,	  namely	  in	  determination	  of	  serious	  injury	  and	  thus	  the	  reasoning	  was	  not	  applicable	  to	  the	  benefit	  analysis,	  and	  that	  even	  if	  the	  AB	  was	  right	   to	   include	   supply-­‐side	   factors	   in	   its	   reasoning	   the	  AB	   still	   had	  no	   reason	   to	   find	  those	  factors	  to	  outweigh	  demand-­‐side	  factors.	  235	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Pal	  argues	  that	  such	  an	  interpretation	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  earlier	  interpretations	  of	  the	  term	  benefit	  as	  well	  as	  with	   the	  object	   and	  purpose	  of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement.236	  Moreover,	  Pal	   criticises	   that	  the	  AB	  included	  the	  supply-­‐mix	  decision	  in	  its	  reasoning,	  as	  the	  supply-­‐mix	  was	  part	  of	  the	  very	  measure	   the	  AB	  was	   to	  assess.237	   	  Pal	  also	  criticises	   the	  AB’s	   finding	   that	   the	  government	   of	   Ontario	   created	   another	   market	   that	   did	   not	   exist	   by	   supporting	  renewable	  energy	  producers,	  instead	  Pal	  argues	  that	  in	  fact	  the	  Government	  of	  Ontario	  only	   supported	   inefficient	   supporters	   in	   an	   already	   existing	   market,	   as	   opposed	   to	  creating	   a	   market	   for	   a	   whole	   new	   product	   that	   did	   not	   exist	   before.	   Ultimately,	   Pal	  argues	   that	   the	   interpretation	   by	   the	   AB	   in	   Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   leads	   to	   a	  detrimental	  result	  due	  to	  that	  it	  allows	  states	  to	  choose	  to	  promote	  different	  production	  technologies	  in	  their	  markets.238	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Rubini	   cautions	   that	   the	  statement	  by	   the	  AB	  distinguishing	  between	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  governmental	  market	   creation	  and	  on	   the	  other	   governmental	   intervention	   in	   already	  existing	  markets	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  and	  that	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  decision	  risk	  having	  far-­‐reaching	  implications	  for	  the	  subsidy	  regime,	  due	  to	  that	  the	  vague	  language	  opens	  up	  for	   analogical	   interpretations	   in	  other	   cases.239	  Rubini	  holds	   that	   the	  AB’s	   idea	  was	   to	  create	   space	   for	   governments	   to	   make	   supply-­‐mix	   decisions,	   without	   those	   being	  regarded	  as	  subsidies.	  However,	  in	  doing	  so,	  the	  AB	  failed	  to	  provide	  answers	  to	  crucial	  questions	  regarding	  the	  limit	  of	  policy	  space	  for	  governments.240	  	  	  Moreover,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that,	   due	   to	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   interpretation	   of	  benefit	  by	   the	  AB	  giving	  member	  states	  significantly	  more	   leeway	  to	  subsidise,	   the	  AB	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  Pal	  (n	  212)	  130.	  236	  Pal	  (n	  212)	  132-­‐133.	  	  237	  Pal	  (n	  212	  )	  133-­‐134.	  	  238	  Pal	  (n	  212)	  134.	  	  239	  Rubini,	  ‘What	  does	  the	  recent	  WTO	  litigation	  on	  renewable	  energy	  subsidies	  tell	  us	  about	  methodology	  in	  legal	  analysis?’	  (n	  87)	  15.	  240	  Rubini,	  ‘What	  does	  the	  recent	  WTO	  litigation	  on	  renewable	  energy	  subsidies	  tell	  us	  about	  methodology	  in	  legal	  analysis?’	  (n	  87)	  15-­‐16.	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will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  to	  interpret	  the	  term	  benefit	  in	  this	  way	  but	  will	  eventually	  have	   to	   extend	   the	   interpretation	   to	   cover	   some	   of	   the	  measure	   that	   would	  with	   the	  interpretation	   in	   Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   fall	   outside	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.241	  	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  the	  criticism	  and	  potential	  prospect	  of	  future	  decisions	  of	  the	  AB	  further	   clarifying	   the	   exact	   scope	   of	   its	   reasoning,	   it	   can	   be	   concluded	   that	   Canada	   –	  
Renewable	   Energy,	   being	   a	   recently	   adjudicated	   case	   on	   the	   benefit	   determination	   as	  well	   as	   the	  only	   case	   concerning	  FIT	  programmes,	  provides	   important	   information	  on	  the	  benefit	   assessment	  with	   regards	   to	  FIT	  programmes	   in	   the	   law	  as	   it	   stands	   today.	  Although	   the	   characteristics	   of	   FIT	   programmes,	   particularly	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   tariff	  above	  the	  prices	  paid	  for	  electricity	  from	  conventional	  sources,	  at	  a	  first	  glance	  appears	  to	   clearly	   provide	   a	   benefit	   to	   the	   producer	   the	   case	  Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	  has	  arguably	   opened	   up	   for	   a	   possibility	   that	   FIT	   programmes	   can	   be	   designed	   so	   that	   a	  benefit	  is	  not	  conferred.	  	  	  Although	   the	   AB	   in	   Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   found	   that	   not	   enough	   evidence	   had	  been	  presented	  before	  the	  AB	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  complete	  the	  legal	  analysis	  and	  rule	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  thus	  the	  case	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  that	  the	  FIT	  programme	  was	  consistent	  with	  WTO	   law	   -­‐	  on	   the	  contrary,	   the	   reasoning	  by	   the	  AB	  regarding	   the	  wind	  power	  prices	  suggests	   that	   the	   prices	   paid	   by	   Ontario	   indeed	   were	   too	   high	   and	   thus	   provided	   a	  benefit242	   -­‐	   the	   case	   nevertheless	   is	   important	   as	   the	   AB’s	   discussion	   of	   appropriate	  benchmarks	  provides	  a	  blueprint	  for	  how	  FIT	  programmes	  can	  be	  designed	  in	  order	  not	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  subsidy	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  	  	  
3.3	  Specificity	  Pursuant	   to	   article	   1.2	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement,	   a	   subsidy	  must	   be	   specific	   for	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   to	   be	   applicable,	  meaning	   that	   even	   if	   a	  measure	   fulfils	   the	   definition	   of	   a	  subsidy	   it	   would	   still	   be	   excluded	   from	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   if	   it	   did	   not	   fulfil	   the	  requirement	   of	   specificity.	   Essentially,	   specificity	   concerns	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	  subsidy	   is	   available	   across	   the	   board	   to	   all	   enterprises	   or	   industries	   or	   whether	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  See	  for	  example	  Cosbey	  and	  Mavroidis	  (n	  21).	  242	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.245.	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subsidy	   is	   limited	   to	  only	   certain	   industries	  or	  enterprises.	  Only	   specific	   subsidies	  are	  deemed	  to	  distort	  trade	  and	  therefore	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  applies	  to	  such	  subsidies	  only	  whereas	   non-­‐specific	   subsidies	   not	   favouring	   certain	   industries	   or	   enterprises	   are	  allowed	   under	   the	   SCM	   Agreement.243	   The	   requirements	   for	   specificity	   are	   set	   out	   in	  article	   2	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement,	   which	   pinpoints	   four	   different	   categories	   of	   specific	  subsidies.	  	  	  According	  to	  article	  2.1,	  a	  subsidy	   is	   first	  specific	   in	  the	  situation	  where	  the	  subsidy	   is	  aimed	   at	   particular	   enterprises	   and	   second	  where	   a	   subsidy	   is	   targeted	   at	   particular	  industry.	   Third,	   a	   subsidy	   can	   be	   specific	   when	   it	   is	   limited	   to	   enterprises	   within	   a	  certain	   geographical	   region,	   according	   to	   article	   2.2.	   	   Fourth	   and	   lastly,	   pursuant	   to	  article	  2.3	  of	   the	  SCM	  Agreement,	   all	   prohibited	   subsidies,	   i.e.	   subsidies	   contingent	  on	  export	  performance	  or	  the	  use	  of	  domestic	  over	  imported	  goods,	  are	  also	  considered	  to	  be	  specific.244	  	  	  Thus,	  for	  a	  subsidy	  to	  be	  deemed	  specific	  it	  must	  be	  shown	  that	  a	  subsidy	  is	  specific	  to	  any	   of	   the	   groups	   mentioned	   above.	   However,	   article	   2.1(b)	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	  specifies	   certain	   criteria	   that,	   when	   adhered	   to,	   will	   ensure	   that	   a	   subsidy	   is	   not	  considered	  to	  be	  specific.	  Among	  these	  criteria	  is	  that	  for	  a	  subsidy	  to	  be	  non-­‐specific,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  based	  on	  objective	  criteria	  or	  conditions.245	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  even	  if	  a	  subsidy	  is	  not	  in	  law	  explicitly	  reserved	  for	  a	  particular	  industry	  or	  enterprise,	  i.e.	  de	  jure	  specific,	   it	  can	  still	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  de	  facto	  specific	  if	  the	  subsidy	   is	  only	  used	  by	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  certain	  companies	  or	  predominantly	  used	  by	   certain	   companies.	   It	   can	   also	   be	   considered	   de	   facto	   specific	   if	   the	   government	  grants	   a	   disproportionate	   part	   of	   the	   subsidies	   to	   certain	   companies	   or	   if	   the	  government	  favours	  certain	  companies.	  Notably,	   this	  has	  been	  clarified	  through	  article	  2.1(c)	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  which	  expressly	  holds	  that	  even	  if	  a	  subsidy	  appears	  to	  be	  non-­‐specific	  but	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  subsidy	  might	  in	  fact	  be	  specific,	  it	  is	  possible	   to	   take	   into	   account	   additional	   criteria,	   such	   as	   whether	   the	   subsidy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243	  Magnus	  Lodefalk	  and	  Mark	  Storey,	  ‘Climate	  Measures	  and	  WTO	  Rules	  on	  Subsidies’	  (2005)	  39	  Journal	  
of	  World	  Trade	  23,	  30.	  244	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  2.	  245	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  2.1(b).	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programme	   is	   only	   used	   by	   a	   few	   enterprises,	   predominantly	   used	   by	   certain	  enterprises,	  whether	  disproportionately	  large	  amounts	  of	  subsidy	  is	  granted	  to	  certain	  enterprises,	  and	  how	  the	  granting	  authority	  handle	  the	  applications	  for	  subsidies,	  i.e.	  the	  rate	  of	  approval	  or	  refusal.246	  The	  intent	  of	  the	  negotiators	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  with	  this	  regulation	  was	  to	  include	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  subsidies.247	  	  	  Effectively,	   the	   requirement	   of	   specificity	  means	   that	   subsidies	   that	   are	   available	   to	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   players	   in	   the	   economy	   does	   not	   fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	  and	  are	  consequently	  allowed	  under	  WTO	  law.248	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  limited	  case	  law	  available	  so	  far	  regarding	  the	  specificity	  requirement	  suggests	  that	  rationale	  behind	  this	  test	  is	  to	  exclude	  from	  the	  discipline	  of	  subsidies	  those	  that	  relate	  to	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods	   as	   well	   as	   subsidies	   granted	   pursuant	   to	   objective	  criteria	  or	  conditions.249	  	  	  Turning	   to	   the	   design	   of	   FIT	   programmes,	  Howse	   argues	   that	   it	  would	   be	   possible	   to	  provide	   non-­‐specific	   subsidies	   to	   promote	   the	   use	   of	   renewable	   energy	   if	   they	   were	  provided	  to	  users	  of	  renewable	  energy	  and	  were	  available	  generally	  to	  all	  enterprises	  in	  the	  economy.250	  However,	  as	  FIT	  programmes	  as	  described	  above	  targets	  producers	  of	  renewable	   energy	   this	   might	   not	   be	   the	   case	   for	   FIT	   programmes.	   Instead,	   such	  programmes	  would	  in	  all	  likelihood	  be	  considered	  specific	  as	  subsidies	  to	  enterprises	  in	  a	  particular	   industry.	  This	   is	  because,	  as	  Wilke	  argues,	  subsidies	   for	  renewable	  energy	  will	  by	  definition	  be	  available	  only	   to	  certain	   industries	  and	  enterprises,	  namely	   those	  involved	  in	  producing	  green	  energy.251	  Thus,	  a	  FIT	  programme,	  as	  designed	  above,	  will,	  even	   if	   designed	   as	   broadly	   as	   possible,	   necessarily	   provide	   a	   subsidy	   to	   a	   particular	  industry,	  namely	   to	   the	   renewable	  energy	   industry.	   Indeed,	  Rubini	  questions	  both	   the	  possibility	  as	  well	  as	  the	  desirability	  to	  design	  subsidies	  for	  renewable	  energy	  so	  as	  they	  are	  not	  specific.	  Importantly,	  Rubini	  questions	  the	  desirableness	  of	  such	  a	  design,	  as	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  SCM	  Agreement	  article	  2.	  247	  Trebilcock	  and	  Fishbein	  (n	  82)	  21-­‐22.	  248	  Van	  den	  Bossche	  and	  Zdouc	  (n	  37)	  764.	  	  249	  Bigdeli	  (17)	  21.	  250	  Howse	  (n	  7)	  13.	  	  251	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  17.	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finds	  in	  his	  study	  that	  for	  a	  subsidy	  to	  be	  effective	  from	  an	  environmental	  and	  economic	  perspective	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  necessary	  for	  the	  subsidy	  to	  be	  targeted	  more	  closely.252	  	  	  Moreover,	   even	   if	   a	   FIT	   would	   be	   designed	   to	   be	   available	   generally	   for	   all	   different	  sources	  or	   technology	   for	  renewable	  energy,	   thus	  being	  as	  broad	  as	  possible,	   it	  would	  still	   only	   target	   a	   small	   part	   of	   the	   energy	   market.	   Even	   if	   in	   fact	   renewable	   energy	  would	  constitute	  the	  dominant	  or	  exclusive	  part	  of	  the	  energy	  market,	  thus	  making	  the	  subsidies	  available	  to	  virtually	  all	  players	  on	  the	  energy	  market,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	   energy	  market	   is	   still	   only	   a	   very	   small	   part	   of	   the	   total	   economy.253	   Rubini	   also	  points	  out	   that	  particularly	   the	  provision	   in	   article	  2.1(c)	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   risks	  constituting	   an	   obstacle	   in	   that	   a	   subsidy	   under	   this	   provision	   can	   still	   be	   considered	  specific	   if	   the	   subsidy	   programme	   is	   not	   sufficiently	   broadly	   available	   throughout	   the	  economy.254	  	  	  While	  it	  is	  yet	  unclear	  how	  narrowly	  targeted	  a	  subsidy	  must	  be	  to	  fulfil	  the	  specificity	  requirement,	  thus	  for	  example	  how	  small	  the	  group	  of	  enterprises	  and	  industries	  must	  be	  for	  a	  subsidy	  to	  be	  specific,	  as	  the	  WTO	  case	  law	  does	  not	  provide	  much	  guidelines	  in	  this	   question,255	   there	   is	   nevertheless	   evidence	   in	   case	   law	   that	   suggests	   that	   for	   a	  subsidy	  programme	  to	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  available	  throughout	  the	  economy,	  more	  is	  required	  than	  proving	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  enterprises	  or	  sectors	  are	  eligible	  for	  the	  subsidy.256	  	  With	  regards	  to	  FITs,	  designed	  as	  outlined	  above,	  they	  would	  most	  certainly	  be	  regarded	  as	  specific	  subsidies	  in	  accordance	  with	  article	  2.1	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  Moreover,	  as	  both	   Wilke	   and	   Rubini	   point	   out,257	   it	   appears	   unlikely	   that	   it	   would	   be	   possible	   to	  design	   a	   FIT	   that	  would	   not	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   specific	   subsidy,	  without	   the	   very	  purpose	  of	  the	  subsidy	  being	  lost	  in	  the	  process.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  548.	  253	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  548-­‐549.	  254	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  548.	  255	  Sykes	  (n	  89)	  103	  and	  Bigdeli	  (n	  17)	  21.	  256	  US	  –	  Softwood	  Lumber	  IV	  and	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  548.	  257	  Wilke	  (n	  75)	  17	  and	  Rubini,	  ‘Ain’t	  Wastin’	  Time	  No	  More’	  (n	  160)	  548.	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However,	  as	  seen	  above,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  design	  FIT	  programmes	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  confer	   a	   benefit	   and	   thus	   do	   not	   fulfil	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   subsidy.	   In	   such	   cases,	   the	  discussion	   about	   specificity	   is	   not	   of	   relevance,	   as	   the	   FIT	   programmes	   would	   be	  excluded	  from	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  already	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  FITs	  are	  specific	  according	  to	  the	  SCM	  Agreement	  will	  only	  be	  of	  relevance	  with	  regards	  to	  FIT	  programmes	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  tariff	  level	  that	  reflects	  a	  higher	  price	  than	  the	  market	  benchmark	  as	  described	  by	  the	  AB	  in	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  and	  thus	  is	  considered	  to	  confer	  a	  benefit,	  and	  in	  that	  case	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  specificity	  requirement	  would	  most	  likely	  also	  be	  fulfilled	  and	  the	  SCM	  Agreement’s	  rules	  would	  thus	  be	  applicable	  to	  such	  a	  measure.	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4.	  Conclusions	  This	   dissertation	   aimed	   to	   clarify	   the	   WTO	   law	   on	   subsidies	   with	   regards	   to	   FIT	  programmes	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  some	  thoughts	  on	  the	  possibility	  for	  member	  states	  to	  maintain	   such	  programmes	   in	  place.	   In	  order	   to	  do	   this,	   a	  model	   of	   a	  FIT	  programme	  containing	   the	  most	   common	   characteristics	   of	   FITs	  was	   outline	   in	   chapter	   2.	   In	   this	  chapter	  it	  was	  found	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  characteristics	  that	  will	  be	  common	  to	  all	  FIT	  programmes	  regardless	  of	  where	  they	  are	  operated.	  The	   first	  one	  was	   found	  to	  be	   the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  purchase	  obligation,	   imposing	  on	  electric	  utility	  companies	  an	  obligation	  to	   purchase	   electricity	   from	   renewable	   energy	   producers.	  Moreover,	   FIT	   programmes	  were	   found	   to	   contain	   a	   predefined	   tariff	   level,	   most	   likely	   based	   on	   the	   cost-­‐based	  method,	  which	  provides	  for	  a	  recovery	  of	  the	  costs	  as	  well	  as	  an	  added	  reasonable	  rate	  of	   return	   and	   which	   will	   usually	   be	   set	   above	   the	   market	   price	   for	   conventional	  electricity.	  Lastly,	  FIT	  contracts	  were	   found	   to	  provide	   for	  a	   long	  duration	  of	   the	   tariff	  payment,	   usually	   around	  20	   years.	  While	   it	  was	   found	   that	   all	   FITs	  will	   contain	   these	  particular	  features,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  can	  be	  financed	  and	  operated	  in	  different	  ways,	   the	  most	   common	  ways	  being	  a	   government	   financing	   the	  programme	  using	   revenues	   from	   taxation	  or	  a	   financing	  of	  a	  programme	  by	  private	  parties	  where	  the	  government	  only	  acts	  as	  a	  regulator.	  	  	  After	  having	  outlined	  the	  basic	  features	  of	  a	  FIT	  programme,	  the	  dissertation	  turned	  to	  the	   question	   of	   whether	   a	   FIT	   programme	   containing	   such	   features	   is	   considered	   a	  specific	  subsidy	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  WTO	  SCM	  Agreement,	  and	  thus	  if	  the	  SCM	  Agreement’s	   discipline	   on	   subsidies	   is	   applicable.	   In	   the	   analysis	   the	   various	  requirements	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   were	   clarified	   and	   analysed	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  FIT	  programmes.	  The	  analysis	  shows	  that	  despite	  consisting	  of	   the	  same	  basic	  features,	  different	  considerations	  arise	  depending	  on	  how	  such	  programmes	  are	  operated	  and	  financed,	  notably	  with	  regards	  to	  if	  the	  programmes	  are	  carried	  out	  by	  public	  or	  private	  bodies.	  Particularly	   this	  applies	   to	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   there	  has	  been	  a	  financial	  contribution,	  where	  the	  difference	  between	  public	  and	  private	  financing	  appears	   to	   potentially	   have	   implications	   for	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement.	  While	   it	   is	   fairly	   straightforward	   to	   establish	   that	   the	   purchase	   obligation	   in	   FIT	  programmes	   makes	   the	   programme	   qualify	   as	   one	   of	   the	   actions	   included	   in	   article	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1.1(a)(1),	  as	  it	  essentially	  provides	  for	  a	  purchase	  of	  goods,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  such	  action	  is	  attributable	  to	  the	  government	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  more	  problematic.	  	  	  With	  respect	  to	  this	  issue,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  operated	  directly	  by	  a	  government	  or	  by	  a	  government	  through	  a	  public	  body	  can	  be	  quite	  easily	  deemed	  to	  fulfil	   the	  requirements	  of	  a	   financial	  contribution	  by	  a	  government.	  However,	   it	   is	   less	  clear	  whether	  a	  FIT	  programme	  where	  the	  government	  only	  acts	  as	  a	  regulator	  whereas	  the	   programme	   is	   carried	   out	   and	   financed	   by	   private	   parties	  would	   be	   considered	   a	  financial	   contribution	   by	   a	   government.	   As	   it	   is	   a	   prerequisite	   in	   order	   for	   a	   FIT	  programme	   to	   be	   considered	   a	   subsidy	   that	   the	   financial	   contribution	   is	   made	   by	   a	  government,	  the	  conclusion	  with	  regards	  to	  this	  requirement	  is	  paramount.	  	  	  	  While	  there	  are	  some	  arguments	  suggesting	  that	  a	  government	  could	  design	  a	  FIT	  where	  it	   acts	   as	   a	   regulator	   that	   would	   not	   be	   qualified	   as	   a	   financial	   contribution	   by	   a	  government,	   the	  most	   likely	  outcome	  appears	   to	  be	   that	  also	  FITs	   financed	  by	  private	  parties	  could	  be	  considered	  financial	  contributions	  by	  a	  government.	  Particularly	  this	  is	  due	   to	   a	  development	   in	   case	   law	  extending	   the	   interpretation	  of	   normal	   government	  practices	   beyond	   those	   relating	   to	   taxation	   and	   expenditure,	   thus	   opening	   up	   for	   a	  possibility	  to	  include	  regulatory	  measures,	  such	  as	  FITs,	  within	  its	  scope.	  	  	  Additionally,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   even	   if	   a	   measure	   would	   not	   be	   considered	   a	  financial	  contribution	  it	  could	  still	  fulfil	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy	  if	  the	  measure	  can	  be	  considered	  price	  support.	  In	  this	  respect	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that,	  while	  not	  entirely	  certain	  due	   to	   the	   limited	   case	   law	   on	   the	   issue,	   FITs	  would	  most	   likely	   be	   considered	   price	  support	  and	  could	  thus	  also	  on	  this	  basis	  be	  considered	  subsidies.	  	  	  	  However,	   the	   finding	   that	  a	  FIT	  would	  most	   likely	   fulfil	   the	   requirement	  of	   a	   financial	  contribution	  or	  price	  support	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	   that	  a	  FIT	  programme	  would	  amount	   to	   a	   subsidy	  under	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.	  Notably,	   as	   has	   been	   seen	   above,	   the	  requirement	  of	  a	  conferral	  of	  a	  benefit	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  requirement	  that	  provides	  for	  an	  opportunity	  for	  states	  to	  design	  FITs	  in	  a	  way	  so	  that	  they	  will	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  scope	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement.	   Due	   largely	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   AB	   defined	   the	  relevant	  market	   in	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	   a	  possibility	   for	  states	   to	  maintain	  FIT	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programmes	  was	  opened	  up,	  as	  this	  conclusion	  by	  the	  AB	  effectively	  opened	  up	  for	  an	  interpretation	   of	   the	   term	   benefit	   that	   excludes	   FITs	   from	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.	  The	  AB’s	  reasoning	  that	  supply-­‐side	   factors,	  such	  as	   factors	  relating	  to	   the	  production	  method,	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   account	  when	   defining	   the	   relevant	  market,	  lead	  it	  to	  the	  finding	  that	  the	  relevant	  market	  was	  not	  the	  market	  for	  electricity	  from	  all	  sources	  but	  rather	  the,	  by	  the	  government	  created,	  market	  for	  renewable	  energy.258	  This	  conclusion	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  with	  regards	  to	  FIT	  programmes,	  as	  the	  relevant	  market	  will	  then	  likely	  be	  determined	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  market	  for	  renewable	  energy	  due	   to	   the	   particular	   supply-­‐side	   factors	   for	   production	   of	   renewable	   energy.	   The	  limitation	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  to	  the	  market	  for	  renewable	  energy	  thus	  opens	  up	  for	  a	  possibility	  for	  states	  to	  design	  FIT	  programmes,	  even	  including	  features	  such	  as	  a	  tariff	  set	  higher	   than	   the	  price	   for	  electricity	   from	  conventional	  energy	  sources,	  without	   the	  FIT	   programmes	   being	   considered	   subsidies	   and	   thus	   risking	   to	   breach	   the	   SCM	  Agreement.	  	  	  While	  the	  AB’s	  reasoning	  has	  lead	  to	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  states	  to	  design	  programmes	  where	   renewable	   energy	   producers	   are	   paid	   more	   than	   conventional	   producers	   of	  energy,	  due	  to	  the	  way	  the	  relevant	  market	  is	  determined,	  states	  nevertheless	  need	  to	  be	  mindful	  of	  the	  tariff	  level	  when	  designing	  such	  programmes.	  As	  can	  be	  concluded	  from	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  AB	  in	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  possibility	  that	  the	  tariff	  level	  may	  be	  deemed	  to	  provide	  a	  benefit,	  should	  it	  be	  set	  too	  high.	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  even	  suggested	  by	  the	  AB	  that	  the	  tariff	  level	  in	  the	  Ontario	  FIT	  programme	  was	  set	  at	  a	  too	  high	   level	   and	   thus	  would	  be	   considered	  a	  benefit,	   although	  enough	  evidence	  had	  not	   been	   provided.	   259	   	   Thus,	   the	   tariff	   level	   still	   need	   to	   not	   be	   set	   higher	   than	  what	  would	  be	  available	  under	  market-­‐based	  conditions	  for	  each	  of	  the	  technologies,	  with	  the	  supply-­‐mix	  considered	  as	  a	  prerequisite.260	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  FIT	  programmes	  do	  not	   provide	   a	   benefit,	   states	   should	   take	   note	   of	   the	   guidance	   provided	   by	   the	   AB	   in	  
Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  on	  possible	  ways	  to	  determine	  an	  appropriate	  benchmark	  in	  the	  renewable	  energy	  market.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  258	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.178.	  259	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.245-­‐5.246.	  260	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  para	  5.190.	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Seeing	   as	   the	   conferral	   of	   a	   benefit	   is	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   a	   measure	   to	   amount	   to	   a	  subsidy	  according	  to	  the	  SCM	  Agreement,	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  benefit	  for	  FIT	  programmes	  means	   that	   the	  measures	   are	   exempted	   from	   scrutiny	   under	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   and	  thus	  that	  the	  WTO	  regime	  on	  subsidies	  would	  not	  pose	  any	  threat	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  to	   maintain	   in	   place	   such	   programmes.	   Thus,	   regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   in	   this	  dissertation	   has	   been	   found	   that	   FIT	   programmes	   would	   necessarily	   be	   specific	  according	   to	   article	   2	   of	   the	   SCM	   Agreement,	   the	   SCM	   Agreement	   would	   not	   be	  applicable	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  FITs	  do	  not	  fulfil	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  subsidy.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  sum,	   it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  FITs,	  as	  described	   in	  chapter	  2,	  cannot	  be	  considered	  specific	  subsidies	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  rules	  in	  the	  WTO	  SCM	  Agreement,	  and	  that	  it	  thus	   is	   possible	   for	   member	   states	   to	   continue	   to	   use	   such	   programmes	   in	   order	   to	  promote	  the	  use	  of	  renewable	  energy.	  	  	  	  After	   having	   answered	   the	   research	   questions	   of	   the	   dissertation	   some	   concluding	  thoughts	   on	   the	   law	   will	   be	   provided.	   In	   the	   introduction	   of	   this	   dissertation	   the	  graveness	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   its	   link	   to	   fossil	   fuels	   were	   stressed	   and	   it	   was	  suggested	  that	  the	  ability	  for	  states	  to	  maintain	  FIT	  programmes	  in	  place	  was	  important	  in	   order	   to	   combat	   climate	   change.	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   the	   conclusion	   reached	   in	   this	  dissertation,	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  outcome	  in	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy,	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	   states	   to	   maintain	   FIT	   programmes,	   could	   be	   considered	   advantageous	   from	   an	  environmental	  perspective.	  However,	  the	  reasoning	  in	  Canada	  –	  Renewable	  Energy	  may	  also	  have	  negative	   implications	  in	  that	   it	  might	   lead	  to	  a	  weakened	  subsidy	  regime.	  As	  seen	   in	   the	   discussion	   above	   in	   relation	   to	  Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy,	   it	   is	   not	   only	  measures	   aimed	   at	   achieving	   environmental	   goals	   that	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   market	  introduced	   in	   Canada	   –	   Renewable	   Energy	   will	   allow.	   Indeed,	   as	   Pal	   argues,261	   the	  methodology	  to	  determine	  the	  relevant	  market	  taking	  into	  account	  different	  production	  methods	  opens	  up	   for	   states	   to	   choose	   to	  promote	   certain	  production	   technologies	   in	  their	   markets.	   Thus,	   it	   opens	   up	   for	   a	   possibility	   for	   states	   to	   offer	   incentives	   and	  benefits	  to	  industries	  without	  the	  environmental	  benefit.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  261	  Pal	  (n	  212)	  134.	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While	   allowing	   states	   to	   support	   certain	   domestic	   industries	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  reasonable	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  ability	  to	  combat	  climate	  change,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  such	  opportunities	  should	  be	  opened	  with	  regards	  to	  other	  industries,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  environmental	  benefit	  but	  where	  the	  only	  result	  would	  be	  that	  states	  support	  inefficient	   producers	   using	   inefficient	   technology.	   Such	   an	   application	   of	   the	   rules	   on	  subsidies	  appears	  to	  counter	  the	  very	  idea	  and	  aim	  of	  the	  subsidies	  regime,	  to	  discipline	  practices	  that	  distort	  international	  trade.	  	  Hence,	   in	  the	  future	  a	  different	  approach	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  subsidies	  in	  order	   to	   accommodate	   measures	   with	   an	   environmental	   aim	   without	   weakening	   the	  subsidy	  regime	  might	  be	  needed.	  As	  discussed	  by	  some	  authors,262	  an	  option	  that	  might	  prove	  better	  could	  be	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  through	  negotiations	  in	  the	  WTO,	  aiming	  to	  carve	  out	  an	  exception	  for	  environmental	  measures	  in	  the	  SCM	  Agreement.	  Indeed,	  such	  exceptions	   are	   not	   foreign	   to	   WTO	   members	   as	   they	   previously	   existed	   in	   the	   SCM	  Agreement	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   now	   expired	   green	   light	   subsidies	   and	   environmental	  exceptions	  exist	   in	   for	  example	   the	  GATT.263	  Although	   the	  very	   slow	  progress	   in	  WTO	  negotiations	  might	  make	   this	   seem	  an	  uncertain	  solution,	   it	   is	  nevertheless	   something	  that	   could	   be	   considered	   as	   it	   might	   provide	   the	   global	   trading	   community	   with	   an	  opportunity	   to	  develop	   the	   trading	   rules	   and	   tailor	   them	   to	   the	  new	  challenges	  of	   the	  21st	  century.	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